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REWRITING THE CONSTITUTION: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
PROCESS
DONALD J. BOUDRFAUX* & A.C. PRITCHARD
In this Article, the authors develop an economic theory of the constitutional
amendment process under Article V focusing particularly on the roles that Con-
gress and interest groups play in that process. The authors construct a model to
predict when an interest group will seek an amendment rather than a statute to
further its interests, highlighting how interest group maintenance costs and antici-
pated opposition affect that choice They then discuss the efficiency goals of con-
stitutionalism-precommitment and reduction of agency costs--and argue that
the structure of the amendment process under Article V prevents realization of
these goals The authors contrast the Bill of Rights amendments, which estab-
lished precommitments and reduced the agency costs of government, with the
latter seventeen amendments, which expanded the federal government and in-
creased agency cost They attribute the change in the nature of the amendments
to the interest-group domination of the political process and Congress' control
over the constitutional amendment agenda The authors conclude that the Foun-
ders' intent to put the Constitution beyond the reach of factions backfired:
although factions cannot control the content of the Constitution, neither can the
majority. In fact, Article V prevents the majority from precommiting itself and
hinders its ability to control the agency costs of government, as evidenced by the
history of the failed amendments Although the authors conclude that Article V
thwarts the efficiency goals of constitutionalism, they predict that little can be
done to remedy this flaw.
INTRODUCTION
C ONSTITUTIONS establish the "higher law" of the land by estab-
lishing the basic structural and procedural principles of government.
In addition, they constrain governments' power to interfere with the
rights and liberties that citizens regard as too precious to trust to their
public officials. These constitutional constraints on public officials would
be chimerical if they could be altered by ordinary polities. As Bruce
Ackerman points out, "all the time and effort required to push an initia-
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tive down the higher law-making track would be wasted unless the Con-
stitution prevented future normal politicians from enacting statutes that
ignored the movement's higher law achievement." 1 Constitutional law is
higher, however, only when compared with the results of daily politics; it
limits the hurly-burly of everyday politics by providing "rules of the
game."'2  Accordingly, constitutions are designed to be more durable
than statutes.3
The United States Constitution attains this durability by making the
process of amending it more difficult and more costly than the enactment
of ordinary statutes by using both supermajorities and split deci-
sionmakers. Thus, Article V permits Congress, by a two-thirds vote of
each house, to propose amendments, and requires a minimum of three-
fourths of the state legislatures to ratify a proposed amendment for it to
become a part of the Constitution.4 Alternatively, Article V provides
that the Constitution may be amended by convention, though this
method has never been employed.5
Since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, only twenty-seven
amendments have been enacted out of the more than 10,000 proposed in
Congress.6 Notwithstanding the significant obstacles placed in the way
of those seeking constitutional change, the relative rarity of successful
constitutional amendments still poses something of a puzzle. After all,
although the Founders created barriers to amendment, they did not want
to foreclose it entirely. In fact, the Founders conceived Article V as a
1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 9 (1991).
2. Gary M. Anderson et a]., Behind the Veil: The Political Economy of Constitu-
tional Change, in Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Economics 89, 89 (W. Mark
Crain & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1990).
3. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Inter-
est-Group Perspective, 8 J. Legal Stud. 165, 168-69 (1979) ("'[A] constitutional provision
confers more durable protection than is possible by ordinary legislative action.' " (quoting
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 892 (1975))); Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional
Rights, 7 J.L. Econ. & Organization 313, 329 (1991) ("A right created by a simple major-
ity vote in the postconstitutional stage is less secure than one protected by the constitu-
tion, since it can be taken away by a majority vote.").
4. Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Pro-
vided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. Const. art. V.
5. See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law 184 (1984).
6. See Richard B. Bernstein & Jerome Agel, Amending America: If We Love the
Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 169 (1993).
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remedy to the overly difficult amendment process under the Articles of
Confederation.7 Moreover, one might have expected that the growth of
the regulatory welfare state, and concomitant shift in the allocation of
power from the state governments to the federal government, would have
resulted in additional constitutional protections, in order to restrain and
focus the power of the federal government. Yet, this has not been the
case.
We construct in this Article an economic framework to explain the
constitutional amendment process and the relative dearth of amendments
enacted through that process. Using efficiency justifications commonly
offered for constitutionalism, we also evaluate the twenty-seven amend-
ments that have been enacted. Employing the traditional method of eco-
nomic analysis of political institutions, we also explore the influence of
interest groups on amendment of the Constitution. This method, known
as Public Choice analysis,' assumes that public-sector employees are no
more enlightened, intelligent, or public-spirited than persons who work
in the private sector.9 Consequently, government actors and interest
groups rationally pursue their own self-interests in the same way that
private actors do in the marketplace; i.e., they further their self-interest
by seeking a governmental privilege: a rule or law that is favorable to a
group.
Public Choice theory is now accepted as a useful tool for understand-
ing the outcomes of political processes I° as well as the behavior of bu-
7. As Alexander Hamilton reportedly remarked at the Constitutional Convention,
"It had been wished by many, and was much to have been desired, that an easier mode of
introducing amendments had been provided by the Articles of Confederation." 5 The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
531 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845).
8. We distinguish between "positive" and "normative" Public Choice literature.
The former describes and predicts political events, while the latter evaluates the way
political institutions should be structured. James Buchanan has contributed much to the
normative Public Choice literature on constitutions. See generally James M. Buchanan,
Freedom in Constitutional Contract (1977) (arguing that individuals can secure and re-
tain freedom only in constitutional contracts). For a methodological justification for dis-
tinguishing between positive and normative social science, see Milton Friedman, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics 3 (1953).
9. See, eg., James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Con-
duct of Representative Government, in Public Choice and Constitutional Economics 3
(James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988). Gwartney and Wagner state:
[T]he men and women working in government as politicians and bureaucrats
are pretty much like their counterparts in the private sector. If pursuit of such
rewards as personal wealth, power, and prestige motivates people in the market-
place, there is every reason to believe that these same elements will motivate
them in the political arena.
I at 7.
10. See eg., Randall G. Holcombe, An Economic Analysis of Democracy (1985)
(developing new public choice model of resource allocation by representative democracy);
Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy,
An Inquiry Into the Interest-Group Theory of Government (1981) (using public choice
approach to study the behavior of politicians in supplying legislation and wealth trans-
fers); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
1993]
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reaucratic agencies."' Other than some early work by James Buchanan
and Gordon Tullock, 12 however, positive Public Choice theory generally
has not been used to study the constitutional amendment process. Ex-
ceptions exist,13 but our survey of the Public Choice literature reveals a
relative inattention to the economics of constitutional change. We hope
here to begin to fill this gap.
In this Article, we analyze the role of interest groups in shaping the
United States Constitution and the prospects for majoritarian control of
the process of constitutional amendment. In Part I, we examine the leg-
islature's role in supplying privileges to interest groups, comparing it
with other sources of supply, and comparing the forms those privileges
take, either as statutes or as amendments. We then construct a positive
model predicting when interest groups will be willing to pay the greater
costs of constitutional protection, emphasizing how the costs of organiz-
ing those groups and their expected opposition affects that choice. In
Part II, we discuss two normative economic theories that provide effi-
ciency justifications for constitutionalism. The first, precommitment, is a
device that restrains majorities from taking actions that they might later
regret.1 4 The second, reduction of agency costs,1 5 attempts to limit the
damage willful government actors impose on the public. 6
Part III applies our positive model to the normative goals of constitu-
tionalism and predicts that the obstacles to amendment will stymie any
majoritarian precommitment to restrict the power of government, and
thus the power of the majority. For similar reasons, constitutional
amendments limiting the agency costs of the federal government are also
unlikely. Under our model, amendments remain possible only in highly
consensual contexts or where members of the group (or groups) disad-
vantaged by an amendment are too diffuse to establish effective
opposition.
After constructing our theoretical model, Part IV examines Congress'
historical record in amending the Constitution and concludes that this
ence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983) (creating economic model of political competition among
pressure groups).
11. See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government
(1971) (applying economic analysis to bureaucracies); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory
of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 47-52 (1983) (same).
12. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent ch. 6
(1962).
13. See, e.g., McCormick & Tollison, supra note 10; Mueller, supra note 3.
14. See infra part II.A.
15. Agency costs are all costs incurred by a principal in relying upon another person
(or persons) to accomplish the principal's tasks. Agency costs are the sum of "(1) the
monitoring expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and]
(3) the residual loss." Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308
(1976). The third component of agency costs, residual loss, results from the fact that few,
if any, agency relationships will perfectly protect principals from their agents' shirking
behavior. See id.
16. See infra part II.B.
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record substantially conforms with our model. Comparing the amend-
ments composing the Bill of Rights with the latter seventeen amend-
ments, we demonstrate that the increase in interest-group activity that
followed the creation of a strong federal government has altered dramati-
cally both the amendment process and the results that flow from it.
While the Bill of Rights established credible precommitments and re-
duced agency costs, the amendment process has evolved toward ex-
panding the federal government and increasing Congress' ability to
extract rents and to redistribute wealth. Finally, we look at several failed
amendments, examine the reasons for their failure, and predict the pros-
pects for passage of some recently proposed amendments. We conclude
that Article V thwarts the efficiency goals of constitutionalism, which is a
consequence of Congress' control over the amendment agenda and inter-
est-group domination of the political process. We predict, however, that
little can or will be done to remedy this defect. The Framers had but one
chance to get Article V right, before the federal government became es-
tablished; we must live with their failure to do so. Economics' epithet as
the "dismal science"17 is well-deserved in this instance.
I. INTEREST-GROUP RENT-SEEKING THROUGH STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
In this Part, we construct a predictive model of constitutional amend-
ment. We focus on the choices interest groups make, both among suppli-
ers of special privileges (the legislature, executive, judiciary), and the
durability of those privileges (achieved either through statute or amend-
ment). We argue that interest groups invest in political activity so as to
maximize their investment returns. We argue further that the value an
interest group places on durability turns on the organizational ability of
both the group and its opposition.
First, we assume that people are always self-interested rational ac-
tors.1" This approach is necessarily reductionist, but the gains in analyti-
cal precision and predictive power outweigh the loss of subtlety and
texture. Notwithstanding our view of individual behavior, we recognize
that societal and economic changes can alter the constraints on people's
cost-benefit calculus, thus altering observed political behavior and, occa-
sionally, people's view of the Constitution. It follows that people seek
constitutional change to further their own interests. Political activity,
broadly defined, produces constitutional amendments-in short, the
Constitution is not above politics. We reject a romanticized view of the
Constitution, just as we reject a romanticized view of politics in
17. James M. Buchanan, Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems, in Theory of
Public Choice 11, 17 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1972).
18. See, e-g., iL at 16 ("The economic model of behavior is based on the motivational
postulate of individual utility maximization.").
1993]
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general.19
Second, we further assume that rational actors pursue monopoly rents
in the political arena. 0 Monopolistic opportunities can be created
through government action; economists describe the expenditures actors
incur in creating and exploiting such opportunities as "rent-seeking."'"
Government regulation provides the most durable streams of rents be-
cause the government typically can limit entry to the market by competi-
tors.2 2 To maximize the expected net benefits of rent-seeking, interest
groups will rationally allocate their funds among alternative suppliers of
privileges (legislature, executive, judiciary, and administrative agen-
cies).2 3 Thus, the branches of government comprise a set of alternative
fora in which interest groups pursue privileges.
Rent-seeking through the government can occur in several ways.
First, interest groups can seek rents from the executive branch by lobby-
ing for changes in administrative regulations and enforcement practices.
Second, interest groups can secure rents through the judiciary by per-
suading courts to interpret statutes or constitutional provisions in a man-
ner consistent with their goals. Whenever a judge interprets a statute,
she implicitly determines the value of the rents generated by that rule
and identifies the beneficiaries of those rents. Accordingly, interest
groups possessing a stake in the interpretations of statutes and regula-
tions will attempt to influence judicial decisions through investments in
litigation and by influencing judicial selection.24 In some cases, however,
19. For a more high-minded view of the nature of constitutional change, see Acker-
man, supra note 1, at 34-57.
20. In economic theory, a rent is a payment to a supplier exceeding the supplier's
costs. See, e.g., Edwin G. Dolan & David E. Lindsey, Economics 535 (6th ed. 1991)
("An economic rent is any payment to a factor of production in excess of its opportunity
cost."). Because a supplier requires monopoly power in order to earn returns in excess of
costs over time, economists often use the term "monopoly profit" as a synonym for rent.
21. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575 (1982). Of
course, at the limit, competition among interest groups could entirely dissipate the avail-
able rents, and legislative activity would yield only normal returns. Nonetheless, the
attempted investment in rent-seeking leads to deadweight social loss. See Richard A.
Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807, 812 (1975).
22. See Yale Brozen, Is Government a Source of Monopoly?, in Is Government the
Source of Monopoly? and Other Essays 4 (Cato Institute Paper No. 9, 1980). The gov-
ernment's ability to protect monopolies is in turn the product of the government's mo-
nopoly over the legitimate use of deadly force. This monopoly over deadly force can be
valuable, as the death toll among firms selling illegal drugs testifies. Violence often will
be the most cost-effective way to protect monopoly profits (ignoring externalities).
Legislators can extract rents from firms by threatening regulation that would destroy
or impair the value of prior industry-specific capital investments. See Fred S. McChes-
ney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J.
Legal Stud. 101, 103-09 (1987).
23. See Susan M. Olson, Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond
the Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. Pol. 854, 858 (1990) ("Often the same grievance
can theoretically be remedied through favorable administrative action, state or federal
legislation ... or even the popular ballot if initiative and referendum are available. ...
[AIll [interest groups] seek the most effective use of their resources.").
24. See, e.g., Ira Glasser, Talking Liberties, Civil Liberties (ACLU, New York, NY),
[Vol. 62
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expected judicial hostility to a provision may require the more drastic
approach of constitutional amendment to ensure that that provision will
succeed. Third, interest groups may seek rents by lobbying the legisla-
ture to enact a statute. Protective tariffs and import quotas, farm subsi-
dies, and occupational-licensing requirements are only a few examples of
the many interest-group privileges obtained by statute. Last-and most
important for our purposes-interest groups can seek rents from the leg-
islature through constitutional provisions. We focus here on interest
groups seeking rents through constitutional amendment, as well as the
ability of discrete interest groups to block amendment proposals that
otherwise enjoy wide public support.'
Once an interest group has decided upon the legislature as the source
for its desired privilege, the group must choose whether to seek enact-
ment of a new law or a constitutional amendment. Why do we not wit-
ness all interest groups seeking and securing constitutional protections
for their desired privileges? The inevitable economic answer: constitu-
tional provisions cost more. This is, of course, by design.
Simply put, amendments cost more because they require more lobby-
ing and other expenditures than statutes. Usually, an interest group can
achieve its desired political goals at a lower cost through statutory enact-
ment than through constitutional amendment, especially at the federal
level. Enacting a federal statute requires the approval of only a majority
of each house of Congress (or, in the event of a Presidential veto, ap-
proval by two-thirds).26 In contrast, an amendment requires the ap-
proval of a two-thirds majority in Congress (or two-thirds of state
legislatures), as well as the approval of three-fourths of the state legisla-
tures (or three-fourths of the states by convention).2 7 Moreover, the in-
terest group incurs the costs of amendment immediately, while the
benefits accrue only in the long run. The interest group thus discounts
those future benefits to reflect the time value of money. In addition, fu-
ture changes in technology may reduce the value of an amendment to an
interest group.2" More important, an interest group may fear losing its
investment to future unexpected judicial interpretation of an amendment,
which also limits the group's demand for the amendment. An amend-
ment that backfires on an interest group may be exceptionally costly to
repeal.
Winter 1991-92, at 12 (discussing the role of anti-abortion groups in judicial selection
during the Reagan-Bush era: "Our opponents' organization changed politics, and politics
changed the Court.").
25. Persuading the Supreme Court to change its interpretation of the Constitution
provides an alternative to rent-seeking through constitutional amendment. An inquiry
into such judicial amendment, however, is far beyond the scope of this Article.
26. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
27. See U.S. Const. art. V.
28. See McChesney, supra note 22, at 101. For example, a constitutional amendment
conferring a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of buggy whips would have been
extremely valuable in 1890, and virtually worthless in 1990.
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One can predict when a group will choose to pursue statutory protec-
tion over a constitutional amendment. If the benefits of amendment are
greater than the costs of obtaining one, a group will opt for constitutional
change. If the added cost of constitutional protection exceeds the added
benefit for an interest group, that group will pursue statutory protections.
Explaining this choice requires an understanding of how the costs and
benefits of traveling the constitutional route differ among groups.
A. Maintenance Costs
Interest groups differ in their "maintenance costs." Maintenance costs
are the costs an interest group incurs over time in order to continue to
lobby effectively for privileges conferred by the government. We hypoth-
esize that interest groups with high maintenance costs have a greater de-
mand for constitutional protection of their privileges than do groups with
low maintenance costs.
This hypothesis is an intertemporal application of Mancur Olson's the-
ory of collective action.29 The theory of collective action holds that a
group of individuals sharing an identifiable common interest often faces
significant obstacles in organizing to compete for favorable legislation. 0
Olson's theory focuses on the costs of initial organization; our applica-
tion of that theory focuses on the costs of maintaining group organiza-
tion over time.
Group size directly influences maintenance costs. For example, reduc-
ing the number of farmers lowers their costs of political organization. If
farmers' wealth and the aggregate power of their votes remain constant
(as it would under a geographical, rather than numerical, representation
scheme like that of the United States Senate), their political clout-and,
hence, their political gains-will increase relative to that of other polit-
ical actors.31 The smaller the group, ceteris paribus, the more potent
their political force.
As groups grow larger, maintenance costs increase because of the diffi-
culty of excluding non-contributors from the benefits of favorable legisla-
29. See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard Econ. Stud. No.
124, 1965).
30. See id. at 7. Olson states that:
[I]t would not be rational for [a particular producer] to sacrifice his time and
money to support a lobbying organization to obtain government assistance for
the industry. [It is not] in the interest of the individual producer to assume any
of the costs himself. A lobbying organization, or indeed a labor union or any
other organization, working in the interest of a large group of firms or workers
in some industry, would get no assistance from the rational, self-interested indi-
viduals in that industry.
Id. at 11 (original emphasis deleted).
31. See, e.g., The Economist Survey ofAgriculture, The Economist, Dec. 12-18, 1992,
at S3 (in insert appearing after page 60) (providing empirical evidence showing the world-
wide increase in farm subsidies as the number of farmers has decreased). The organiza-
tion of farmers is enhanced by the existence of giant agribusinesses which find it profitable
to lobby for privileges for agriculture.
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tive activity. A classic free-rider problem arises whenever individuals
have incentives to hold out or shirk from the group effort-32 This prob-
lem occurs when each member of a group refuses to pull his own weight
in the hope that the collective efforts of other members will make up for
his laxity. Group organizers may respond by rewarding members for
cooperation or sanctioning them for noncooperation. 3 They can limit
these selective incentives to participating members in the group and thus
discourage free riding in other benefits where exclusion is more diffi-
cult.34 Despite these incentives, larger groups generally will have higher
organization costs over time than smaller groups.
High-maintenance-cost groups will not anticipate being an effective
political force in the future. Because they have no assurance of maintain-
ing their organization in future periods, high-maintenance-cost groups
are likely to demand the greater durability provided by amendments. On
the other hand, low-maintenance-cost groups anticipate their continued
effective organization through time. Thus, because these groups have a
comparative advantage in purchasing continued protection of their privi-
leges from future legislatures, they value constitutional protections less
and are more likely to seek statutes.
Compare a group seeking an amendment that confers mainly diffuse or
ideological benefits (prohibition of alcohol, for example) with a labor
union seeking a provision that excludes non-union labor from govern-
ment-contract work. Proponents of Prohibition cannot keep the benefits
derived from prohibiting alcohol consumption from being enjoyed by
those who did not contribute to the passage of a Prohibition amendment.
All who oppose drinking gain psychological satisfaction from the in-
creased sobriety in the community. 5 Free riders cannot be excluded;
therefore, the group seeking Prohibition has high maintenance costs. By
contrast, union leaders collect dues period after period from the benefi-
ciaries of the rule excluding non-union labor, thus offsetting their mainte-
nance costs and facilitating group organization over time.36
A group that has coalesced only temporarily, such as Prohibitionists,
cannot defend statutory privileges against competing interest groups in
the future. By contrast, a low-maintenance-cost group, like a union, can
lobby the legislature period after period, and can thus achieve and main-
32. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 29, at 48 ("the larger the number of members in the
group the greater the organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle that must be
jumped before any of the collective good at all can be obtained").
33. See id at 51.
34. See id
35. This assumes that the rule is effective, a subject of considerable dispute in the
Prohibition era.
36. See e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (af-
firming that unions may collect "agency fees" (dues) from every employee--union mem-
ber or not-within a unit it represents). The Court recognized that agency fees eliminate
the problem of free riders, "non-members who obtain, without cost to themselves, the
benefits of collective bargaining procured through the efforts of the dues.paying mem-
bers." Id at 763 n.14.
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tain its privileges at a lower total cost over time. Therefore, an interest
group's demand for constitutionally protected privileges will rise as its
maintenance costs increase. Conversely, a group with decreasing mainte-
nance costs will reduce its demand for constitutional amendments.37
B. Strength and Timing of Expected Opposition
Also affecting an interest group's choice between constitutional
amendments and statutes is its expectation of opposition to its proposal.
This opposition may be weak or strong, and it may arise in the present or
the future. Thus, a proposal can encounter one of four possible forms of
opposition.
First, significant opposition may never arise. Opposition may be too
weak in the present to block a constitutional amendment or statute, and
may also have no future prospect of successfully challenging the propo-
sal. Second, significant and lasting opposition may coalesce immediately
upon introduction of a proposal. Such opposition may be strong enough
to block an amendment, and may even be strong enough to block a stat-
ute. Third, strong opposition to a proposal may be expected to emerge
only in the future. Finally, significant opposition may exist in the pres-
ent, but be expected to decline in the future. An interest-group's choice
between an amendment and a statute will vary depending on how it per-
ceives the strength and timing of its opposition.
When considering the strength of a group's opposition, one must re-
member that the opposition must be stronger to block a statute than to
block an amendment. Consider an amendment to the Constitution. Ar-
ticle V requires the agreement of two-thirds of the members of each
house of Congress and three-fourths of state legislatures. To block the
amendment, opponents need only muster negative votes from just over
one-third of Congress or from just over one-fourth of the state legisla-
tures. Therefore, opponents will almost always prevail unless they are
geographically confined, with access to only an exceptionally limited
number of representatives or financial resources. By contrast, blocking a
statute requires greater political muscle. Absent a presidential veto, op-
ponents must marshal, not one-third, but over one-half of congressional
votes, and do not have an opportunity to block the proposal in the states.
Another factor contributing to an interest group's choice between
amendment and statute is the timing of opposition. Suppose that a pro-
posal generates no notable opposition at the present time and no opposi-
37. This conclusion assumes that interest groups' leaders are well-behaved agents for
members of the groups. If leaders promote their own welfare at the expense of the group,
the analysis becomes more complex. To avoid unnecessary complexities, we assume that
leaders of interest groups do not themselves constitute interest groups within interest
groups and that leaders are reasonably good agents for their members. On the intricacies
of this problem in the context of interest-group litigation, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving
Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
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tion is expected in the future. Such a proposal is one for which societal
consensus is likely to persist over long periods-for example, a proposal
making the Fourth of July a national holiday. Lacking significant oppo-
sition to the proposal, proponents could secure an amendment with rela-
tive ease. In this case, however, the additional benefits of amendment do
not justify the added costs. Under these circumstances, two reasons will
lead advocates of the proposal to settle for a statute. First, a statute
would face little risk of future repeal because there is unlikely to be fu-
ture opposition to it. Second, even when there is little cost to securing a
super-majority, as here, there are other costs to amendments, such as the
cost of lobbying states for approval. Simply put, a statute is cheaper.
Thus, when interest groups anticipate no significant strengthening of op-
position, a statute will do just as well as a constitutional amendment at
much less cost.38
One example of such a proposal is a change that is Pareto-improving. 39
By definition, such a proposal will make some people better off without
making anyone worse off; i.e., no one loses now or in the future. A
Pareto-improving change never generates opposition.' Although such
changes cost relatively little to enact, proponents of Pareto-improving
proposals will not seek to enact them through amendment unless the ex-
isting constitution requires it. This may seem counter-intuitive, but be-
cause no opposition to a Pareto-improving statute is expected to emerge,
and since there is little risk of future repeal, an amendment would confer
no additional benefits over a statute.
A proposal can fail to generate opposition (without being Pareto-im-
proving) where free-rider problems prevent significant opposition from
arising, even where the proposal generates net losses in social welfare.
As the number of members in a group increases, per-capita benefits de-
crease and the likelihood of free riding increases. If a sufficient number
of group members free ride, the group accomplishes little or nothing.4"
When the losers are dispersed widely and have nothing in common other
than their losses from the proposal, organizing political opposition may
be prohibitively costly.42 Proponents who anticipate no future opposi-
tion will settle for a statute and save the additional costs of an
amendment.
Consider the second possibility: significant opposition currently exists
and is expected to last long into the future. In such a case, opponents
38. This assumes the political strength of the proponent group remains unchanged
over time.
39. See David D. Friedman, Price Theory 438 (2d ed. 1990) (defining Pareto im-
provement as "a change that benefits one person and injures nobody").
40. This assertion ignores strategic behavior.
41. See Olson, supra note 29, at 48.
42. But see Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic and Republican Parties as
Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (discussing political
parties as organizational devices for reducing the cost of political activity by dispersed
groups).
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will likely have at least the minimum number of votes necessary to block
a proposed amendment. Indeed, the highly visible process of proposing a
constitutional amendment may signal to opposing interest groups the
need to block even a vaguely worded proposal. Moreover, it is difficult to
tie an amendment to other more popular proposals as is often done in so-
called "omnibus" statutes. 43 In the present-opposition scenario, oppo-
nents may even be able to block a statute.
The fact that a proposal is opposed immediately, however, has no rela-
tion to its potential social benefit or harm. Such a proposal may in fact
reduce social welfare-for example, a proposal to do away with police
and fire protection-but it need not necessarily do so. For instance, con-
sider a proposal that would eliminate import restrictions and tariffs on
foreign goods. Economists almost universally agree that trade restraints
reduce overall social welfare.' The beneficiaries of trade restraints are
concentrated, however, and can immediately oppose all free-trade pro-
posals; the losers are dispersed and unable to respond effectively. In such
a case, a constitutional amendment guaranteeing free trade is exceedingly
unlikely; even a statute faces considerable obstacles.
Consider the third case: opposition currently wields no political power
but is expected to do so in the future. Reasons for such delayed opposi-
tion vary. Opponents may currently lack political voice but will gain it
in the future-for example, prospective immigrants. Also, potential
losers under the proposal may not know during the current period that
they will be harmed if the ex ante chance that a randomly selected person
will be a winner under the proposal exceeds fifty percent or if there is
inadequate information during the current period about the likely gen-
eral effects of the proposal. This prospect has some aspects of a Rawlsian
"veil of ignorance," 45 but we make no normative assumptions about the
rules at issue.
This delayed-opposition scenario is the paradigm for constitutional
amendment. Supporters of this third type of proposal can more easily
garner the votes necessary to secure a constitutional amendment in the
current period. Because an amendment, rather than a statute, will better
withstand organized opposition in the future, proponents expect higher
net benefits from an amendment than from a statute. Therefore, interest
groups will desire an amendment in the current period, making it more
costly for opponents to repeal.
Consider the final possibility, in which opposition arises today but is
43. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388.
44. See, e.g., Bruno Frey et al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An
Empirical Inquiry, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 986 (1984) (reporting the results of an interna-
tional survey of 936 economists showing that nearly nine out of ten economists agree that
tariffs and import quotas typically reduce general economic welfare).
45. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 12, 136-42 (1971) (arguing for a procedural
device whereby people would choose the rules for society before society comes into exist-
ence and, hence, before people know their particular places in society).
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expected to diminish in the future. In the present, the opposition can
block both an amendment and a statute. In the future, however, the op-
position will probably not be strong enough to block even a statute.
Thus, an interest group will play a waiting game until the opposition
subsides, and will then seek to enact a statute.
In sum, our economic theory predicts that advocates of a proposal will
choose to secure it through an amendment either when they have high
maintenance costs, or when opposition is weak today but expected to
intensify in the future. Otherwise, the interest group will typically find a
statute to be an attractive substitute for an amendment.
II. EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM
We shift now from the positive theory of constitutional change to nor-
mative justifications for constitutionalism. The normative criterion ap-
plied here is wealth maximization, otherwise known as efficiency.4' This
Part discusses two efficiency justifications that have been offered for con-
stitutionalism: precommitment and reduction of agency costs.
A. Precommitment
Economists commonly view constitutions as societal precommitment
devices. They assume that, ordinarily, the availability of more choices
increases wealth. Yet, it is not unlikely that individuals will take poten-
tially rash or harmful actions in the future that are inconsistent with
their long-term self-interest. Consequently, if possible, one would like to
foreclose that possibility by limiting one's range of future choices. Thus,
the economic theory of precommitment theorizes that an individual will
restrict his future range of choices in order to rationally maximize his
utility (or "preference satisfaction") over the long run. In like manner,
by having his crew bind him to the mast, Ulysses avoided being drawn to
the rocks by the enchanting song of the sirens.4" Ulysses knew that he
was only imperfectly rational, and he rationally planned to overcome his
weakness. 48
Extending this theory from individuals to societies, precommitment
through a constitution allows a supermajority to put certain actions be-
yond the power of government and, thus, beyond the reach of any subse-
quent majority coalitions. By limiting the range of collective choice,
constitutions protect a realm of individual decision-making.49 Constitu-
tionalism can hence bind an entire society to the mast.
46. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice at vii (1981). For a critique of
efficiency as a normative justification for legal rules, see Jules L. Coleman, Markets,
Morals, and the Law (1988).
47. See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 36
(1979).
48. See id.
49. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 12, at 72 (discussing the relative advantages
of collective and individual choice).
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In his classic study, Jon Elster lists five criteria for precommitment:
(i) To bind oneself is to carry out a certain decision at time t, in order
to increase the probability that one will carry out another decision
at time t2 .
(ii) If the act at the earlier time has the effect of inducing a change in
the set of options that will be available at the later time, then this
does not count as binding oneself if the new feasible set includes
the old one.
(iii) The effect of carrying out the decision at t must be to set up some
causal process in the external world.
(iv) The resistance against carrying out the decision at t, must be
smaller than the resistance that would have opposed the carrying
out of the decision at t 2 had the decision at t, not intervened.
(v) The act of binding oneself must be an act of commission, not of
omission.5
Constitutions may satisfy these criteria. The great durability of constitu-
tional provisions permits majorities to put certain actions effectively be-
yond their reach, thus satisfying the first criterion. Although
constitutions both grant and limit power, only the limits qualify as
precommitments and satisfy the second criterion. Importantly, judicial
independence creates an enforcement mechanism external to
majoritarian agents, which satisfies the third criterion. By placing a
binding interpretation power in a life-tenured group of decisionmakers,
the majority has placed their precommitment beyond their ability to re-
nege (assuming faithful agency on the part of the judiciary"1 ). In con-
trast, placing precommitment enforcement in the hands of majoritarian
agents in the legislature would not limit future choices effectively.
Satisfaction of the fourth criterion, however, requires some degree of
uncertainty in evaluating potential future positions or other causes for
delay in opposition. If actors can predict who will win or lose under a
given rule, resistance to its implementation at t, will be as great as at t2 .
On the other hand, if no one knows how a rule will affect them, the level
of resistance will be less in the future than in the present, thus making
enactment of the rule more likely. Finally, constitutions generally satisfy
the fifth criterion because they require affirmative conduct to be enacted.
Thus, societies, like individuals, theoretically can precommit to a future
50. Elster, supra note 47, at 39-46.
51. For an analysis of this assumption, see Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard,
Reassessing the Role of the Independent Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains,
Const. Pol. Econ. (forthcoming) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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course of conduct.52 Defining who does the precommitting, however,
substantially complicates the assessment of the value of constitutions as
societal precommitment devices, because constitutional provisions inevi-
tably carry over from generation to generation.
How does a majority of society precommit to its preferences at the
least cost? Societal preferences may remain relatively stable between
generations. If so, granting earlier generations a preferred position in
shaping the constitution is the least-cost method of precommitment. 53
Even this modified version of precommitment, however, appears to run
foul of Elster's fifth criterion requiring that precommitment be an act of
commission, not omission. Societal failure to repeal a constitutional pro-
vision seems like an act of omission. Elster cites the example of a child
who has reached an age where he is finally able to reject the authority of
his parent, but accedes to that authority nonetheless, deeming it to be in
his best interest.' Elster argues that one cannot be confident that the
child would have subjected himself to this authority if an alternative op-
tion had been available:
The fact that someone prefers not to leave a given state is not evidence
that he would freely have entered that state from all of the states that
are open to him. There are transaction costs and uncertainties in-
volved that destroy the apparent symmetry of entry and exit. ... Pref-
erences are always relative to a past history of choices, and if the child
had known from experience the states to which he prefers the state of
being bound, his preferences might have been very different.55
So, too, with societies. One cannot conclude confidently that the people
of the United States would have arrived at the present constitutional
scheme without its peculiar constitutional history. Indeed, one can argue
confidently the opposite conclusion that, if the American people were to
start from a tabula rasa, the constitution they would choose would differ
substantially from the existing one. Despite these formal obstacles to so-
cietal precommitment, however, the practical realities of interest-group
politics pose an even more formidable barrier to welfare-enhancing socie-
tal precommitment. Constitutionalism-although it grants a preferred
position to the views of individuals long dead-might be the closest ap-
proximation to the aggregation of the precommitment preferences of mil-
lions of people.
52. Constitutions are difficult to amend, which means that constitutional provisions
will inevitably endure throughout generations. From the perspective of pure democratic
theory, this intergenerational binding appears fatal to a normatively justifiable constitu-
tional precommitment-only a current majority can precommit itself. Economic theory,
however, puts aside such normative issues and reduces the question to one of relative
transaction costs.
53. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in Constitu-
tionalism and Democracy 195, 218-19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (discuss-
ing James Madison's views on the difficulty of constitutional amendment).
54. See Elster, supra note 47, at 46-47.
55. Id at 47 (emphasis added).
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Even if this precommitment theory does not accurately and fully re-
flect the contemporary preferences of the governed population, constitu-
tionalizing a rule may be justified if the costs of repeatedly considering a
decision outweigh the benefits of achieving present social preferences.16
Embedding certain rules in the Constitution effectively creates a "dicta-
torship" in the enforcement agent, the federal judiciary, which reduces
the costs of decision-making. 7 This role, however, permits the judiciary
to impose external costs on society, given that the judiciary's views may
differ substantially from those of society at large.5 8 Furthermore, due to
differences in opinions, constitutionalizing a rule may provoke greater
controversy rather than less, as Roe v. Wade59 arguably did.' There-
fore, a simple reduction in decision-making costs is unlikely to justify
delegating decision-making to a judicial "dictator."'6 1
Procedural obstacles in the legislature may adequately protect statutes
from the continual reconsideration that might otherwise justify a dicta-
torship rule. Once enacted, statutes have remarkable staying power. So-
ciety nonetheless may have an interest in using the Constitution to slow
changes desired by the majority. Instability may erode the ability of ma-
jorities to govern if it impairs confidence in popular government. 62 Stabi-
lizing governance rules encourages investment and avoids the
deadweight losses that accrue from continual attempts to manipulate the
decision-making rules.63 In sum, society may benefit from constitutional
precommitment, if the rule adopted reasonably reflects the views of the
majority and is not susceptible to abuse by the chosen enforcement agent.
B. Reduction of Agency Costs
While democratic societies have to concern themselves with
majoritarian overreaching, they also must worry about the agency costs
56. See Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of
Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J. Legal Stud. 227, 229 (1986) (arguing that precedents
make it easier or less costly for judges to rule because they do not have to rethink each
decision). Cf Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in Constitutional-
ism and Democracy, supra note 53, at 19, 20 ("Every institution is equipped to resolve
certain difficulties better than others. By staying its hand, the Court can improve its
overall performance. By refusing either to uphold or overturn a governmental action, it
can avoid decisions that might damage its credibility and overtax its limited problem-
solving capacities.").
57. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 12, at 99 ("One method of eliminating bar-
gaining costs is to delegate decision-making authority to a single individual and agree to
abide by the choices that he makes for the whole group.").
58. See id.
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue, in Constitu-
tionalism and Democracy, supra note 53, at 327, 340-41 (removing the issue of abortion
from public debate through constitutional law may increase conflict).
61. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 12, at 99.
62. See id.
63. See Jon Elster, Introduction to Constitutionalism and Democracy, supra note 53,
at 1, 9.
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of government. These costs make self-restraint more important to socie-
ties than to individuals. Ordinarily, individuals will act in their own self-
interest; they cannot, however, generally rely on others, such as their
representative agents, to act in their best interests. Unfortunately, soci-
ety runs up against the self-interest of its representatives in attempting to
induce those representatives to work on society's behalf. As common
experience demonstrates, voting does not perfectly constrain political ac-
tors to work in the interests of the majority that elected them.
Constituents cannot rely upon their legislators to act as perfect agents.
Entry barriers in the market for legislators create rents that legislators
can extract from the people at large. A lack of perfect competition can
generate legislative "slack," a subject of extensive study by public choice
scholars." Where legislative slack exists, legislators will not act as
agents of the people, but rather in their own interests. Even if legislators
desired to be the perfect agents of their constituents, however, other gov-
ernment actors would contribute to agency costs. Legislators might not
be able to monitor these other government actors effectively. Moreover,
these monitoring costs leave room for government actors in the executive
branch and independent agencies to maximize their own interests, at the
expense of the public at large.
Consequently, society needs to place limits on its political agents. Ac-
cording to the political theories that view government as a form of con-
tract among the governed, people place restraints on government before
it comes into being as a means of decreasing agency costs.6" These theo-
ries reflect the practical insight that once the government has been estab-
lished, government actors form a powerful interest group well-placed to
impose substantial agency costs on the citizenry at large. This consti-
tutes the classic normative case for constitutional limitations."
Constitutionalism promises to reduce these agency costs. For exam-
ple, bicameralism and separation of powers are thought to discourage
interest-group wealth transfers. 7 Split decisionmakers increase legisla-
tors' costs of securing agreement, and hence, the costs of seeking rents.68
64. Sea e.g., Joseph P. KaIt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators. Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L & Econ.
103, 104-06 (1990) (arguing that policymakers' ideology represents rational shirking).
But see William R. Dougan & Michael C. Munger, The Rationality of Ideology, 32 J.L &
Econ. 119, 120-30 (1989) (arguing that apparent ideological voting may be a mechanism
for long-term bonding).
65. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government 48-51 (J. W. Gough
ed., 1947) (1690) (arguing that divestiture of natural liberty ends and civil society begins
when people consent to subject themselves to the political power of a majority-run body).
See also James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty 31-34 (1975).
66. Note the symmetry between this normative position and the delayed-opposition
scenario predicted by our positive theory. See supra part I.B (discussing the strength and
timing of opposition).
67. See Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 50 (1987).
68. See Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12
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Constitutional provisions limiting the means that government actors can
employ or the ends that they can seek have a similar effect.
C. Precommitment and Agency Costs Compared
Although the concepts of agency costs and precommitment are re-
lated, they are distinct. Agency costs arise only when an individual, or
group of individuals, relies on the efforts of another (the agent) to achieve
the individual's goals. Even if a group can rely on its political actors to
act as perfect agents, it also must consider the value of precommitment.
History relates many actions that a majority took that it later came to
regret.69 Constitutional precommitment promises to reduce those costs
of regret, if the majority can decide what actions to place beyond its
reach.
The ideas of precommitment and limiting agency costs have long been
significant elements in constitutional theories. The Framers recognized
these important goals when they were drafting the original Constitu-
tion7° and their views are echoed by modern constitutional theorists. 7I
Modern scholars attempt to dissolve the "counter-majoritarian diffi-
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 145, 151-59 (1992) (arguing, in part, that bicameralism fosters less
wasteful rent-seeking and corruption than supermajoritarianism).
69. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding gov-
ernment detention of Japanese-Americans) with Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
383, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 903 (providing restitution to Japanese-Americans and
Aleuts interned during World War II).
70. Alexander Hamilton argued that an independent judiciary was necessary:
No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid....
[Tihe power of the people is superior to both [the legislature and the judiciary],
and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought
to be governed by the latter rather than the former.
The Federalist No. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Under this view, legislative slack may permit legislatures to impose agency costs by
enacting statutes that are contrary to the interests of the majority and contrary to the
Constitution. Later in the tract, however, Hamilton shifts gears in his defense of in-
dependent judicial enforcement of the Constitution:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts
of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes dissemi-
nate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place
to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
Id. at 469. Independent judges are thus necessary to protect the majority from their own
worst impulses-a classic precommitment strategy where long-term preferences trump
later desires-as well as to limit agency costs imposed by the legislature.
James Madison echoed Hamilton's sentiments:
In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and
oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature,
where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger;
and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted by the
uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect
the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful
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culty"'72 by tying constitutionalism to long-term majoritarian prefer-
ences. Only through ex ante constitutionalism can majorities effectively
constrain themselves and their agents. Once the negative effect of pro-
posed laws on particular interest groups becomes clear, these groups will
converge to derail such laws regardless of the net social benefit. A cen-
tral question that we seek to answer, therefore, is the likelihood of
majoritarian precommitment and reduction of agency costs through con-
stitutional amendment, given the role of interest groups in political activ-
ity. In Parts III and IV, we will use the normative criteria developed
above to evaluate the amendment process and the amendments
themselves.
Ill. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Adopting as our benchmark the efficiency justifications described
above, this Part will now evaluate the Article V amendment process.
Article V's requirements of a split decisionmaker and supermajority
clearly advantage minority interest groups that oppose amendment. The
extremely high cost of amending the Constitution is, of course, by design.
Approval by three-fourths of state legislatures effectively bars proposed
amendments which, if enacted, would directly transfer wealth from soci-
ety at large to a concentrated interest group. State legislatures are com-
prised of representatives of large numbers of people spread over a wide
swath of the national geography, thus creating a great diversity of eco-
nomic interests and culture. This almost guarantees that any interest
group seeking an inefficient transfer of rents by constitutional amend-
ment will have to pay a price that far exceeds the value of the amend-
ment to that group. In fact, of the twenty-seven amendments to the
Constitution in more than 200 years, only a handful can be characterized
factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive to wish for a govern-
ment which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.
The Federalist No. 51, at 324-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison's argument highlights the importance of uncertainty for attaining constitutional
provisions fostering efficiency. See supra part II.A. (discussing Elster's fourth criteria for
precommitment); see also Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 12, at 78 (stating that "[t]he
uncertainty that is required in order for the individual to be led by his own interest to
support constitutional provisions that are generally advantageous to all individuals and to
all groups seems likely to be present at any constitutional stage of discussion").
71. Most notably, this view has been a central theme of James Buchanan's work. See
James M. Buchanan, The Domain of Constitutional Economics, I Coast. Pol. Econ. 1
(1990) (describing constitutional political economic research and distinguishing it from
conventional economics by pointing out that constitutional economics focuses on the
choice among-rather than within--constraints); see also Michael J. Klarman, Constitu-
tional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitu-
tional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759, 795 (1992) ("Sometimes the majority's will is best
effectuated by compelling adherence to its long-term aspirations and commitments,
rather than permitting satisfaction of transient desires. On this view, invalidating a piece
of majoritarian legislation can be perfectly consistent with majoritarianism.").
72. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 17 (1962).
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as devices for inefficiently creating and transferring rents.73 However,
many of the amendments indirectly facilitated the institutional ability of
Congress to serve as a source of rents.
Notwithstanding Article V's protection of the status quo, its proce-
dures cannot guarantee that a majority of the people support a constitu-
tional amendment. Because the Constitution can be amended solely by
the actions of political representatives, the opportunity exists for shirking
by the people's elected representatives. This shirking can take two forms:
enacting an amendment that a majority (or substantial minority) of the
people oppose, or failing to enact an amendment that a supermajority of
the people favor.74
The first possibility, enacting an amendment contrary to the will of the
majority, can take place only under specific conditions. Although Arti-
cle V's requirement of a supermajority in Congress seems to ensure that
at least a majority of the citizenry supports an amendment, agency costs
make a congressional majority no guarantee of a popular majority.
Nonetheless, the supermajority requirement at least increases the odds
that a majority of people favor an amendment. Congress can still enact
an amendment that a majority of the people oppose, however, when a
currently dominant political group has substantial "market power" in
competing for votes. It can use that market power to gain advantages
without fear of political retribution. In our predominantly two-party sys-
tem, a party will have substantial market power when it controls both
chambers of Congress, as well as a substantial majority of the state
legislatures.
Such a landslide is the political equivalent of a major product innova-
tion in a market for goods or services. In product markets, these compet-
itive advantages translate into increased profits for firms. In political
markets, politicians in the dominant party may use their advantage to
centralize power at the expense of competing units of government. 75 Al-
ternatively, a dominant political party may use its current electoral edge
to create a structural advantage that will assist the party in winning fu-
ture elections.76 The currently dominant party may attempt to solidify
its position through amendment to the Constitution, even at the expense
of current political support if a constitutional change promises to yield
73. This is not true of constitutional amendments at the state level. See Anderson,
supra note 2, at 91.
74. From an efficiency perspective, legislative shirking must be judged by the intensity
of groups favoring and opposing a proposal. If a substantial minority vehemently op-
poses a bill that a small majority slightly favors, a legislator would be shirking if he voted
for the proposal under the criteria employed here.
75. See Jody Lipford & Bruce Yandle, Exploring Dominant State Governments, 146 J.
Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 561, 561-65 (1990) (providing empirical evidence that a
state's share of tax revenue increases with concentration of dominant party in state legis-
lature and concluding that dominant parties within state legislatures are able to maximize
their political gains).
76. See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Legislative Monopoly and the Size
of Government, 54 Southern Econ. J. 529, 533 (1988).
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significant future political support."
Where a proposal would appear to benefit all political actors at the
expense of the public at large, little organized opposition to an amend-
ment will arise. Unless the amendment harms the interests of political
actors at the state level, no opposing group will coalesce outside of Con-
gress. Although the public as a whole will suffer from the constitutional
change, without an "outsider" group in a position to generate opposition,
ordinary citizens are too diffused to organize collectively. Congress' con-
trol over the constitutional agenda means that amendments facilitating
the ability of legislators to serve as brokers for rent-seeking will receive
sympathetic treatment in that branch. The only remaining substantive
limit placed on Congress' ability to amend the Constitution is Article V's
guarantee of equal suffrage in the Senate. Thus, Congress is well placed
to impose substantial agency costs on their constituents through amend-
ment to the Constitution.
The second possibility-namely, the failure to enact an amendment
favored by a supermajority of the voting population-is more likely, es-
pecially if that amendment aims to reduce agency costs of government.
Amendments that confer a small benefit on a large percentage of the pop-
ulation are unlikely to find much support in Congress, particularly if that
amendment impairs the interests of its members. Free-rider problems
will keep an effective group from coalescing to push such a proposal.""
In addition, no member of Congress could extract rents from a provision
with widely spread benefits. Although they may be socially desirable,
wide-spread benefits do not produce votes or contributions.
Further, Congress has organized its operating procedures to maximize
the likelihood that its members will be re-elected, not to register voter
preferences efficiently. Congress uses committee systems, rules of order,
and seniority systems to maximize the control exercised by its most se-
nior members, who consequently have substantial control of Congress'
legislative agenda.79 This control facilitates interest-group access to leg-
islative processes (and correspondingly, members' ability to extract votes
and contributions from those interest groups). This access gives interest
groups a great ability to block amendments that might impair their
interests.
The structure of Article V also ensures that interest groups are well-
placed to block majoritarian proposals that might harm the group's in-
terests. Collective-action problems are likely to impede the ability of ma-
jorities to enact constitutional provisions to precommit against rash
77. This assumes the party has the requisite party discipline. Where individual legis-
lators are free to ignore the preferences of the party as a whole, these legislators will have
little incentive to jeopardize their own political base for the advantage of the party.
78. For a discussion of the free rider problem, see supra notes 32-34 and accompany-
ing text.
79. On the efficiency justifications for seniority systems, see Kenneth Shepsle & Barry
Nalebuff, The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups, 6 J.L. Econ. & Organi-
zation 45, 49 (Special Issue, 1990).
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action or to reduce agency costs because the benefits of such provisions
would be spread so widely.
IV. AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
This Part applies the framework developed above to analyze several
amendments to the Constitution. We focus on the role interest groups
play in the process of constitutional amendment and the role Congress
plays as an agenda setter. In particular, we explore the ability of majori-
ties to restrain their political agents through amendment, and the ability
of majorities to precommit against engaging in undesirable future acts.
Our analysis is divided into three subsections: the Bill of Rights, 80 the
Eleventh through Twenty-seventh Amendments, and amendments that
have failed to be proposed or ratified.
A. The Bill of Rights
The concern that the Philadelphia Convention had inadequately re-
strained the federal government drove the campaign for a Bill of
Rights.81 The political setting in which the Bill of Rights was enacted
substantially resembled that of the Convention. In both contexts, gov-
ernment actors were not yet effectively organized as an interest group.
Moreover, the absence of non-governmental interest groups revolving
around the national government made both the original deal and the sub-
sequent amendments possible. Government actors thus constituted the
sort of delayed opposition found in the paradigm case above for constitu-
tionalizing a rule. 2 If a strong federal government had been in place at
80. Some will question treating the Bill of Rights as amendments. Many believe that
those amendments were part of the original deal, necessary to gain enactment of the
Constitution. Nonetheless, the Bill of Rights was enacted through the Article V amend-
ment process. Although James Madison and other supporters of the proposed Constitu-
tion did promise to push for a Bill of Rights in the First Congress after the Constitution
was ratified, see James Madison to George Eve, Orange, 2 January, reprinted in 2 The
Documentary History of the First Federal Elections 1788-1790, at 330-31 (Gordon
DenBoer & Lucy Trumbull Brown eds., 1984), enacting the Bill of Rights was not a
precondition to ratification, nor was the content of the Bill of Rights specified in advance.
The Federalists deflected demands for a second convention and channelled the demand
for a Bill of Rights through the Article V amendment process. See Madison to Alexander
Hamilton, 1788, reprinted in 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 848 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1971) ("The plan mediated by the friends (of) the Constitution is to preface
the ratification with some plain & general truths that can not affect the validity of the act;
& to subjoin a recommendation which may hold up amendments as objects to be pursued
in the constitutional mode."). Therefore, the history of the Bill of Rights does shed light
on the amendment process. Treating the Bill of Rights as part of the original deal sup-
presses the sharp contrast between the character of the first ten amendments and the
latter seventeen. Only the Bill of Rights places substantive limits on federal government
action.
81. See, e.g., William Lee Miller, The Business of May Next 244-59 (1992) (describ-
ing James Madison's encouragement of the campaign for the Bill of Rights).
82. See supra part I.B.
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the time of the Convention and its ratification, the Constitution would
have taken on a very different character.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution promote policies that
could have been accomplished through statutes and that did not require
constitutional amendment. The Bill of Rights restrict the federal govern-
ment's ability to act in certain ways, but nothing in the original Constitu-
tion required amendments to achieve these restraints. Political pressures
on Congress and the Executive might have constrained the government.
After all, absent the Bill of Rights, Congress was not obliged to regulate
speech or the press, or to deny trial by jury, or to inflict cruel and unu-
sual punishments. Proponents of the Bill of Rights sought constitutional
restraints not because amendment was necessary-as a legal matter-to
achieve their goals,83 but rather in order to increase the costs borne by
future opponents seeking to use government in ways prohibited by the
Bill of Rights. Statutory attempts to rein in these officials would likely
have failed because, once the government became established, concen-
trated interest groups would have disproportionate influence in represen-
tative democratic institutions. Moreover, the Convention's innovation of
real majoritarian power in a representative legislature created the possi-
bility of majoritarian abuse, in addition to the familiar agency cost prob-
lem of government. Simple majoritarian protection through a statutory
Bill of Rights would not have sufficed precisely because the benefits flow-
ing from these rights were so widespread." Due to the free-rider prob-
lem, majorities inevitably face the highest maintenance cost in protecting
their prerogatives. On the other hand, government actors are a discrete,
well-organized group with a considerable advantage in the fight for statu-
tory privileges, and they would be a constant threat to repeal a statutory
Bill of Rights. Few would benefit from abrogating these rights; many
would suffer a net detriment from denial of these rights. The former
group thus could more easily solve free-rider problems in order to
achieve legislative success. Therefore, the best chance for citizens at
large to limit the government's power was for the proponents of the Bill
of Rights to insist during the drafting and ratifying stages-before future
government insiders became aware of who they were-that the govern-
ment be checked constitutionally. Otherwise, the agency costs would be
spread too widely for a coherent interest group to emerge and push for
83. Indeed, opponents of the Bill of Rights claimed that government lacked the power
to interfere with individual liberties. In their view, the Bill of Rights was at best superflu-
ous, see James Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia (1787),
reprinted in 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 528, 529 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1971) (stating that the Bill of Rights is a "defect in the proposed constitution"), and,
at worst, mischievous. The mischief they feared was that the enactment of the Bill of
Rights would imply that the federal government possessed greater powers than was in-
tended. See The Federalist No. 84, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
84. See A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic
Analysis of the "New Property", 77 Va. L. Rev. 1053, 1066-74 (1991).
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government limitations. Absent constitutional amendment, the diffuse
majority would have simply been taxed by excessive levels of agency
costs imposed by actors in the federal government.
The Founders thought that the Articles of Confederation were defec-
tive because they conferred too little power on the national govern-
ment,85 and left too much room for wasteful rent-seeking at the state
level.8 6 The inefficient practices of the state governments included the
confiscation of property, the abrogation of debts, the issuance of paper
money, and the imposition of tariffs and taxes on commerce from their
sister states.87 Most members of the Constitutional Convention, there-
fore, had complementary goals: enhancing the power of the federal gov-
ernment and limiting the abuses of overreaching state governments. 88
The Constitution helped attain the goals of strengthening property
rights and the enforceability of contracts, but, in so doing, it sparked the
opposition of state political actors who were dependent on rent-seeking
at their level.89 For example, New York legislators feared the loss of
tariff revenue on imported goods coming through New York en route to
New Jersey and Connecticut.90 The proposed Constitution also raised
fears that a strong federal government would itself act as a powerful in-
terest group, capable of extracting substantial rents. Proto-antifederal-
85. See Randall G. Holcombe, Constitutions as Constraints: A Case Study of Three
American Constitutions, 2 Const. Pol. Econ. 303, 306 (1991).
86. See Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, in American Law and the Constitutional Order 85, 87 (Lawrence M. Friedman
& Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978) (stating that "[tihe ills that beset America... included
. . . 'a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority' [and]... a
pattern of manifest infringement of 'the rights and interests of each other' and oppression
of 'the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions.'" (quoting Madison's notes of
June 8, 1787, in I Records of Federal Convention of 1787, at 164)).
87. See William H. Riker, The Lessons of 1787, 55 Pub. Choice 5, 7 (1987).
88. See John P. Kaminski, The Making of the Bill of Rights: 1787-1792, in Contexts
of the Bill of Rights 18, 19 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990).
Members of the Constitutional Convention also were aware of the efficiency justifica-
tions for constitutionalism, although they articulated these purposes differently. Madison
understood that future government officials were apt to aggrandize themselves at the ex-
pense of citizens at large:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
em men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary. In framing a government.., the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.
The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) Madison's
agency cost perspective anticipates a major theme in Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 12.
Madison also was concerned by the need for majoritarian precommitment in drafting
the Constitution. "It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injus-
tice of the other part." Supra at 323.
89. See Robert A. McGuire & Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and
Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution, 79 Am.
Econ. Rev. 219, 222 (1989).
90. See Kaminski, supra note 88, at 35.
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ists, skeptical of the Convention's prospects for success, boycotted the
Convention confident that they could scuttle any increase in federal
power at the ratification stage.91 The members of the Constitutional
Convention, however, unilaterally changed the rules for ratification.
They bypassed the state legislatures whose approval was required to
make changes under the Articles and sent the proposed Constitution to
state ratifying conventions. In so doing, the Federalists attempted to cir-
cumvent the rent-seeking opposition of state legislators, knowing that
state political actors would jealously protect their prerogatives.92 But the
Federalists' stratagem was not entirely successful. The Antifederalists
countered by seeking a revision of the Constitution. Their arguments
played on the concern that the newly strengthened federal government
would overshadow the state governments.93
The role of state governments complicates the economic account of the
enactment. Like federal political actors, political actors at the state level
imposed agency costs on the people at large. 94 By the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention, state governments already had organized effectively
to protect their interests; thus, state political actors could impose agency
costs on their constituents. Notwithstanding these agency-cost problems,
the interests of state political actors seeking a Bill of Rights roughly coin-
cided with the interests of the populace. An increase in the power of the
federal government would increase the prospects for rent-seeking at the
expense of both the state governments and the people. 9 Conversely, a
decrease in the power of the federal government would increase the op-
portunities for rent-seeking at the state level. 96 Consequently, in addition
to the Bill of Rights, the Antifederalists wanted a clear transfer of power
to the state governments.97
In this, the Antifederalists were only partially successful. Although
91. See Riker, supra note 87, at 16-17.
92. See id at 17.
93. See, eg., Patrick Henry's Speech (June 7, 1788) before the Virginia Ratifying Con-
vention, reprinted in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention De-
bates 210 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (arguing that even if all the citizens of Virginia
wanted to alter the government, they could be prevented from doing so by a minority of
citizens of the United States).
94. Competition among the states for constituents and firms limits the ability of state
political actors to extract rents from their constituents.
95. At the Virginia convention, James Monroe urged that the national government
not be allowed to do "harm, either to States or individuals." Kaminski, supra note 88, at
31. On the congruence of state and individual interests in limiting federal rent-seeking,
note the symmetry of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which respectively reserve
rights to the people and powers to the states.
96. See Debates, New York Ratifying Convention, 1788, reprinted in 2 Schwartz, supra
note 80, at 857, 866 ("The idea of two distinct sovereigns in the same country, separately
possessed of sovereign and supreme power, in the same matters at the same time, is as
supreme an absurdity, as that two distinct separate circles can be bounded exactly by the
same circumference.").
97. See George Mason's Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution, 1787, re-
printed in 1 Schwartz, supra note 83, at 444, 446; Letter of 4grippa, 1788, to the Massa-
chusetts Convention, (Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in id at 516-21; Richard Henry Lee, Letter
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the Bill of Rights (unlike the original Constitution) did not limit the
power of state governments, neither did it provide a clear-cut victory for
political actors committed to rent-seeking at the state level. 98
James Madison, fearing the risks to a strong federal government that a
second convention might bring,9 9 astutely seized control of the agenda
for constitutional change."° Madison carefully chose among the amend-
ments that had been proposed by the state ratifying conventions.' 0 ' He
selected those amendments that reduced the agency costs of the federal
government and served as precommitments against majoritarian abuse,
but did little to increase directly the domain of state-level rent-seeking.
Indeed, Madison further attempted to limit the amount of rent-seeking
available at the state level, but he failed. Madison's proposal to limit
state restrictions on the rights of conscience, the press, and criminal jury
trial was rejected by the first Senate,1"2 whose members were selected by
the state legislatures at that time. Because state governments remained
effective political forces in the early days of the Republic, the failure of
Madison's proposal suggests that the enactment of the Bill of Rights was
not wholly free of interest group pressure.10 3 Nonetheless, Madison
largely succeeded in deflecting the push for increased state power.
Certain amendments, such as the Second"° and the Tenth, 5 explic-
itly protected state governments and state political actors. Other state-
sponsored amendments would have aided their interests indirectly. For
example, one of the amendments proposed by several state ratifying con-
ventions 10 6 (and endorsed by Thomas Jefferson) 0 7 would have prohib-
from the Federal Farmer, Oct. 9, 1787, in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 230, 232 (Her-
bert J. Storing ed., 1981).
98. This is indicated by the tepid response from the Antifederalists to Madison's pro-
posed Bill of Rights. See Kaminski, supra note 88, at 47. See also Miller, supra note 81,
at 262 ("Patrick Henry is reported to have said that he would have preferred a single
amendment disallowing direct taxes to all the amendments approved by Congress.").
99. See Madison to G.L. Turberville, 1788, reprinted in 2 Schwartz, supra note 80, at
930-31.
100. See Miller, supra note 81, at 259. Proponents of the Constitution comprised a
majority in both houses of the first Congress. See Madison to Jefferson, 1788, reprinted in
2 Schwartz, supra note 80, at 993.
101. The state conventions proposed all of Madison's amendments, except for the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and his attempt to limit state government powers.
See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1182 (1991).
102. See Wilfrid E. Rumble, James Madison on the Value of Bills of Rights, in XX
Nomos 122, 136 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979). The Senate also
rejected Madison's proposal to codify the doctrine of the separation of powers. See Her-
man V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During
the First Century of Its History, in 2 Annual Report of the American Historical Associa-
tion for the Year 1896, at 26-27 (1897).
103. See Miller, supra note 81, at 254.
104. U.S. Const. amend. II (establishing the right to bear arms).
105. U.S. Const. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the United States to the
States or to the people).
106. These included Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York. See I Elliot,
supra note 7, at 323, 326, 330.
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ited the federal government from granting monopolies. Madison,
however, omitted this provision from his draft proposal for the Bill of
Rights. 108 While the monopoly amendment would have limited the
power of the federal government to expropriate the wealth of the citi-
zenry at large, it also would have protected the prerogatives of the states
over the property within their boundaries. By limiting the ability of the
federal government to expropriate wealth from individuals, the monop-
oly amendment would have left greater wealth for the states to extract
from their citizens. Rent seekers, as a rule, do not care for competition.
The Bill of Rights, however, largely reduced the agency costs of the
federal government, rather than increased the domain of rent-seeking
available to state political actors. 109 Because state governments provided
a coherent interest group with a substantial interest in revising the draft,
opponents of the proposed Constitution were well-organized. To make
their opposition to the proposed Constitution politically effective, how-
ever, opponents also needed an issue that would generate popular sup-
port and thus garner votes in the first congressional elections. The
Antifederalists invoked the need for a second convention to enact a Bill
of Rights protecting the liberty of the people."' They did not want to
make the same mistake of boycotting a second convention, where the
balance of power would have been more likely to favor the states." '
This strategy took advantage of the popular fear that federal politi-
cians might act contrary to the interests of the people.1 '2 Relying on the
events that led to the Revolution, the rhetoric of the Antifederalists high-
lighted the problem of the government acting as an interest group (affect-
ing agency costs), rather than the need to restrain future majorities
(precommitment). The Declaration of Independence, after all, reads as
an indictment of a distant government that does not respond to the ma-
jority.1 3 It declares a natural right of the people to control their agents
107. See Jefferson to Madison, 1789, reprinted in 2 Schwartz, supra note 80, at 1140-
43.
108. As a result, we only can speculate how such a provision might have affected the
struggle between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court over the New Deal, which
involved a considerable number of government-sponsored monopolies. See generally
Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Congressional Influence and Patterns of New
Deal Spending, 1933-1939, 34 J.L. & Econ. 161 (1991).
109. See Madison to Jefferson, 1788, reprinted in 2 Schwartz, supra note 80, at 992,
993. See also Miller, supra note 81, at 253 ("[Madison] also omitted most of those pro-
posed amendments that did not partake of the nature of great rights of mankind, and all
that were in effect disputes about the powers and structure of government (like amend-
ments removing the direct taxing power).").
110. See Riker, supra note 87, at 29-30.
111. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
112. See Robert A. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, at 124-58
(1955).
113. Each of the passages begins with "HE" and cites a specific failure of the King to
serve the interests of the American people. Included among the charges: "He has refused
to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large Districts of People, unless those
People would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable
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in government. 1 4 There is not a hint of limiting majoritarian powers
here, only objections to the failure of King George III to serve the inter-
ests of the majority, which is a classic agency-cost concern. This concern
for agency costs would have been too diffused to support organized oppo-
sition, however, had it not coincided with the interest of state political
actors in protecting their rent-seeking domain against federal encroach-
ment. Efficiency justifications, no matter how compelling, face substan-
tial political obstacles absent interest group support.
At the time of the Founding, however, interest group politics at the
federal level did not present a great obstacle to the enactment of constitu-
tional provisions fostering efficiency. The weakness of the national gov-
ernment under the Articles of Confederation posed a problem for
efficient government, but presented an opportunity for efficient constitu-
tion writing. 15 Although the national government's weakness created
substantial conflict between the states with commensurate rent-seeking,
the Bill of Rights would not have been enacted if the national govern-
ment had been more powerful at that time.
In fact, the Bill of Rights encountered weak opposition at the time of
enactment, but stronger opposition was anticipated from future political
actors in the federal government. Initially, the Federalists opposed revi-
sion of the proposed Constitution, but they backed down because they
feared that, without a Bill of Rights, a second convention might be
called, or that North Carolina and Rhode Island might decline to join
the still very fragile union." 6 The members of the First Congress essen-
tially were coerced into acting in a public-regarding fashion. If they
failed to produce a credible Bill of Rights, there was a real threat that the
fledgling union would collapse, thus eliminating all possibilities for future
rent-seeking at the federal level.I" Self-interest of the Federalists aligned
with the public interest, but only for a brief period. After being empow-
ered for just a short time, government officials and employees began to
identify their personal interests more closely with that of the govern-
to them and formidable to tyrants only." The Declaration of Independence para. 5 (U.S.
1776).
114. See id. at para. 2.
115. The inefficiency of the national government under the Articles of Confederation
may have been limited to the inability to control rent-seeking by the states. In other
respects, such as limiting the size of the federal government, the Articles may have pro-
vided for more efficient government than that brought about by the new Constitution.
116. See Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American
Bill of Rights 156 (1977). North Carolina had declined to ratify until a Bill of Rights
should be passed. See, e.g., North Carolina Convention Debates, 1788, in 2 Schwartz,
supra note 80, at 933, 959 (Willie Jones, leader of the North Carolina Antifederalists said:
"[South Carolina and Georgia] cannot exist without North Carolina. There is no doubt
we shall obtain our amendments, and come into the Union when we please.").
Rhode Island illustrated rent-seeking run amok at the state level. See Riker, supra note
87, at 22. The state's initial failure to join the Union hardly could have come as a
surprise.
117. See Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Re-
public, 1776-1790, at 351-52 (2d ed. 1979).
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ment. The benefits of limited government to these officials came to be
outweighed by the benefits they would enjoy from their unconstrained
ability to use government as they chose. Government officials then coa-
lesced into an effective interest group, opposing legislative and judicial
attempts to constrain their powers.
Thus, from an agency-cost perspective, enacting the Bill of Rights as-
suaged a generally-held fear that, once empowered, the national govern-
ment would emerge as a powerful interest group in its own right. Once a
government comes into power, political actors inevitably threaten gener-
ally desired liberties.' 18 For example, the First Amendment directly con-
strains Congress' ability to act in each of the amendment's protected
areas." 9 Absent the First Amendment, government officials would have
been too eager to interfere with speech, the press, and so on. Even the
threat of interference would have provided an effective tool for extracting
rents from affected interest groups. 2 ° The Fourth Amendment'
provides another example. Ordinarily, government officials will be suffi-
ciently organized to block any attempts, either statutory or constitu-
tional, to restrict their use of governmental power and their exercise of
discretion. We would predict that the Fourth Amendment would not
have been proposed by Congress if there had been a Federal Bureau of
Investigation in 1789, poised to object to constraints on its investigative
authority. 122
In addition to reducing agency costs, the Bill of Rights precommits the
majority against certain actions. Certainly the drafter, James Madison,
saw the Bill of Rights as an important precommitment device:
[I]n a Government modified like this of the United States, the great
danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative
body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against
that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which pos-
118. Although the Ninth and Tenth amendments do not specify the rights retained by
individuals or the powers denied to the government, they indicate that individuals enjoy
unenumerated rights against the government and that the national government is denied
certain powers. See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amend-
ment, in The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment 13-14 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
119. U.S. Const. amend. I. This is obvious for the freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
and petition, and perhaps less so obvious for freedom of religion. Historically, however,
religion has been a source of jurisdictional competition for government. See Harold
Berman, Law and Revolution 269 (1983) ("Underlying the competition of ecclesiastical
and royal courts from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries was the limitation on the
jurisdiction of each: neither pope nor king could command the total allegiance of any
subject."). See also Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Ap-
proach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1989).
120. See McChesney, supra note 22, at 101.
121. U.S. Const. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable-and warrantless-searches
and seizures).
122. But see Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 38-44 (1969)
(arguing that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to confine the use of warrants,
not warrantless searches).
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sesses the highest prerogative of power. But it is not found in either
the executive or legislative departments of Government, but in the
body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority. 123
Madison believed that the constitutional architecture adopted at the
Convention ameliorated agency-cost concerns. Nonetheless, certain
amendments are difficult to explain on other than agency-cost
grounds.1 24 One explanation is that the Antifederalists' political influ-
ence produced the proposed amendments from which Madison chose his
proposed amendments, thus the concern for agency costs, while
Madison's agenda control allowed him to give play to his concerns in the
drafting, thus the concern for precommitment. Indeed, the true charac-
ter of the Bill of Rights probably captures something of both agency
costs and precommitment-attempts to limit the power of government
ordinarily cannot be parsed neatly into agency cost and precommitment
groups.
In sum, the Bill of Rights restricts government power, thus reducing
the choices available to both majorities and government officials.
Whether the central purpose of the Bill of Rights was precommitment or
reduction of agency costs, its enactment occurred because of the lack of
an established national government. The very existence of government
creates a strong interest group opposed to restrictions on the govern-
ment's latitude-politicians and government employees. Today, because
of the presence of a strong federal government, the Bill of Rights could
not be enacted via Article V.
B. The Eleventh Through Twenty-seventh Amendments
We now turn to the latter seventeen amendments. These amendments,
adopted after the creation of a strong federal government, raise an impor-
tant question: is it still possible, after the government has been estab-
lished and interest groups have coalesced around and within it, to limit
the power of the government through the Constitution?
These amendments, as opposed to the Bill of Rights, provide a truer
test of Article V's efficacy in enacting constitutional provisions that serve
the efficiency justifications of precommitment and reducing agency costs.
At the outset, we note that, unlike the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh
through Twenty-sixth amendments could not have been statutes since
they all required amending the Constitution itself to enact the desired
rule into law. 12 For example, changing the Presidential inauguration
date to January 20th required an amendment because March 4th was
123. House of Representatives Debates, May-June, 1789, reprinted in 2 Schwartz, supra
note 80, at 1012, 1029 (introducing Madison's draft proposal to the House).
124. For example, Madison's first proposed amendment increased the ratified size of
the legislature while his second, now the Twenty-seventh Amendment, limited the ability
of Congress to vote itself pay raises. See id. at 1026.
125. As discussed below, the Twenty-seventh Amendment is an exception. See infra
note 199 and accompanying text.
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specified in the Constitution.1 26 The fact that the rules embodied in
amendments eleven through twenty-six required constitutional amend-
ment suggests that limiting federal power was not a primary objective.
As noted above, rules limiting government typically can be achieved by
statute or amendment; amendment simply achieves greater durability.
Analysis of the latter amendments confirms the intuition that they were
not intended to restrict the reach of the federal government.
1. States' Rights Amendments
One congressional objective in proposing constitutional amendments is
to take power from the other branches of government. Nevertheless,
only five amendments have specifically overruled Supreme Court deci-
sions, although many reflect contemporary interpretations of the Consti-
tution by the Supreme Court. For example, the Eleventh Amendment,
which bars federal courts from adjudicating lawsuits brought against a
state by citizens from another state or foreign country,1 21 overruled the
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 There, the Court ruled that
jurisdiction under Article III extended to lawsuits brought against a
state, thus subjecting states to lawsuits brought in forums beyond their
control. 129
Facing substantial debt obligations still outstanding from the revolu-
tionary era and numerous land claims held by out-of-state and foreign
speculators,130 the states secured the Eleventh Amendment to protect
their treasuries from such claims. Their ability to do so reflects the fact
that the federal government was still in its infancy and the state govern-
ments remained the focus for interest group activity. Further, the bond-
holders and land claimants were widely diffused; many were foreigners
and they had little ability to organize collectively to protect their
interests.
The language of the Eleventh Amendment, however, does not restrict
the ability of state citizens to bring suit in federal court under the Con-
126. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XX with U.S. Const. amend. XII (changing dates of
elections).
127. See U.S. Const. amend. XI. The other examples are: the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, (overruling Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)); the Sixteenth Amendment
(overruling Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)); the Nineteenth
Amendment (overruling Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874)); and the Twenty-sixth
Amendment (overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
128. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
129. See id. at 479.
130. See, eg., Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment denied federal jurisdiction over pending cases brought by citizens
of foreign states against any one of the United States). Nevertheless, the interests of
foreign landholders and bondholders were protected by treaty. See. e.g., Definitive
Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and his Britanic Majesty, Sept. 3,
1783, U.S.-Gr.Brit., art. 5, 8 Stat. 80, 82 (stating that Congress will "earnestly recom-
mend.., to the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all
estates, rights and properties, which have been confiscated, belonging to real British
subjects").
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tract Clause.1 3 1 Smaller, more geographically concentrated groups of
bondholders and landholders within the states were better able to organ-
ize and to protect their rights to enforce state obligations in federal court.
In fact, leaving this avenue open was no oversight-state politicians did
not need to protect the state treasuries against all claimants, only against
claimants who could not vote for them.
The Twelfth Amendment 132 also reflects the ability of the states to
organize to protect their interests in the early days of the republic, albeit
in a more limited way than the Eleventh Amendment. First, the Twelfth
Amendment ensured that Vice-Presidential candidates would not com-
pete against Presidential candidates. More important, the Twelfth
Amendment also clarified the rules for Presidential selection, making the
outcome of the electoral college more certain, thereby reducing the
House of Representatives' opportunity to select a President.' 33
The controversy that followed the election of 1800 made clear to state
legislators that Congress could have a decisive influence in Presidential
elections.134 The Twelfth Amendment makes the vote of the electors, ap-
pointed by the state legislatures, more valuable because the state electors
are more likely to determine the outcome of a Presidential election. It
thus protects the interests of state legislators in Presidential selection.
The Eleventh and Twelfth Amendments are two of only four post-Bill
of Rights amendments that arguably restrict the power of the federal
government. 135 Nonetheless, they hardly qualify as precommitments or
devices to reduce agency costs. Although they may have a slight ten-
dency to reduce the federal rent-seeking domain, they were enacted pri-
marily to permit greater rent-seeking by state political actors, without
any collateral benefit to the citizenry at large.
After these early rent-seeking successes, states' power over the process
of constitutional amendment declined. This occurred partly because the
131. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Supreme Court has ignored the language and ex-
tended the bar to citizens of the state being sued. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1889). For an argument that the Eleventh Amendment means what it says, see Law-
rence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1342 (1989).
132. U.S. Const. amend. XII (modifying procedures for electing the President and
Vice-President).
133. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 Va. L. Rev. 913,
922-23 (1992) (noting that a motivating force behind the adoption of the Twelfth Amend-
ment was the fear that the House would too easily have the opportunity to install an
unqualified President).
134. See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 6, at 62-63. The election of 1800 ended up in an
Electoral College deadlock between Jefferson and Burr. It took thirty-six ballots in the
House of Representatives to break the tie, resulting in the election of Jefferson.
135. The other two are the Twenty-first Amendment (repealing Prohibition), and the
Twenty-seventh Amendment (restricting Congress' ability to vote itself pay raises). We
question below the assumption that the Twenty-first Amendment limited government.
We also note that the Twenty-seventh Amendment is not a post-Bill of Rights amend-
ment, given that it was formally proposed by the First Congress along with the Bill of
Rights; its ratification simply occurred much later than that of the first ten amendments.
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number of states has increased, but primarily because the Thirteenth
through Seventeenth Amendments gave the federal government leverage
over the states. Further, no coherent interest group has emerged to re-
place the states in seeking to limit the power of the federal government.
Thus, the dominant trend of the Amendments has been to expand federal
power and to reduce the checks on that power.
2. Franchise Expanding Amendments
Many of the later amendments expand the right to vote, either directly
or indirectly. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments
extend the franchise to blacks,136 women, 137 and eighteen to twenty-one-
year-olds,1 3' respectively. The Twenty-third Amendment extends the
franchise in presidential elections to citizens of the District of Colum-
bia. 1 39 In addition, the Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibits state en-
forcement of poll taxes in federal elections.Y40
Expanding the franchise has two predictable effects: (1) it provides a
supply of votes to the enacting coalition and (2) it increases the likeli-
hood of redistribution of wealth through government. Dominant coali-
tions are unlikely to offer the franchise to people likely to vote against
them, while opposing groups will seek to block disadvantageous
franchise extensions. For these reasons, franchise extensions are most
likely when a dominant party, able to overwhelm any opposition, stands
to benefit from that extension.
Even if expanding the franchise does not produce a predictable benefit
for one party at the expense of the other, however, a larger electorate
tends to create greater opportunities for redistribution. The franchise
usually is extended to groups that contribute relatively little to the tax
base and consequently favor greater redistribution through govern-
ment." Additionally, while expanding the franchise enhances the inter-
ests of the newly represented, it exacerbates the collective-action problem
of the electorate generally. As more people are allowed to vote, the bene-
fits to the individual voter of monitoring government fall. Extending the
franchise, therefore, reduces average voter monitoring of politicians, 42
136. See U.S. Const. amend. XV.
137. See U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
138. See U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
139. See U.S. Const. amend XXIII.
140. See U.S. Coast. amend. XXIV.
141. See John S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), reprinted
in John Stuart Mill, Three Essays 143, 279 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1975) ("It is also
important, that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be
elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who
pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be
lavish, and none to economize.").
142. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II 205-06 (1989). As Mueller points out:
[w]hen two candidates compete for the votes of a large electorate, each individ-
ual's vote has a negligible probability of affecting the outcome. Realizing this,
rational voters do not expend time and money gathering information about can-
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granting the legislature wider latitude to extract rents from the citizenry
at large.
The Fifteenth Amendment 143 and the two prior Reconstruction
amendments-the Thirteenth1" and Fourteenth' 45-reflect attempts by
the dominant coalition of the Republican Party to lock in future political
support through the Constitution while its opposition was still disen-
franchised. 146 Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 147 as well as
the Fifteenth Amendment,1 48 promised a steady stream of electoral sup-
port for the Republicans, while Section Three of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 149 promised to limit the Democratic Party's competitiveness by
barring its most likely candidates for office.
Other provisions of the amendments were necessary to make voting
rights effective. Citizenship, and the civil rights attendant to citizenship,
are prerequisites to the right to vote.' 50 Moreover, protecting the rights
of property and contract for blacks created a larger base from which
politicians could extract wealth, while at the same time it impaired the
political base of the Democratic Party.'-" It is exceedingly difficult to
extract rents from individuals who are kept in bondage. Republicans
were well aware that opposition to these rules would increase substan-
tially in the future-that is, after Reconstruction. Consequently, these
amendments were enacted when the Republican-controlled federal gov-
ernment had the southern states under military occupation and martial
law, thus limiting the effect of southern racist sentiment at the polls. But
didates. They remain 'rationally ignorant' of both the issues in the election and
the opposing candidates' positions on these issues.
Id. As the franchise is expanded, the typical voter invests less in learning about the issues
and the candidates as well as about the performance of politicians in office.
143. U.S. Const. amend. XV (extending suffrage to all male citizens regardless of race
or color).
144. U.S. Const. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery).
145. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (ensuring against State abridgement of federal privileges
and immunities and guaranteeing the right to due process and equal protection among
other citizens' rights).
146. See William Gillette, The Right to Vote: Politics and the Passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment 163-65 (1965).
147. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. Section Two guarantees proportional representa-
tion and provides for enforcement: "when the right to vote at any election ... is denied
... the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State."
148. U.S. Const. amend. XV.
149. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. Section Three prohibits any Confederate supporter
who held office pre-war from holding federal or state office, unless Congress votes to
exonerate "by a vote of two-thirds of each House."
150. See, e.g., Ga. Const. art. II, § 1, para. I (1974) ("Every person who is a citizen of
the United States and a resident of Georgia as defined by law, who is at least 18 years of
age and not disenfranchised by this article, and who meets minimum residency require-
ments as provided by law shall be entitled to vote at any election by the people.").
151. Insofar as competition from black producers and merchants reduced the profits of
their white counterparts, Democratic politicians could extract fewer rents from their core
political base.
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the Republicans could not doubt that Reconstruction eventually would
give way to a restoration of political power to the former Confederate
states. Therefore, politicians from the victorious Union states seized the
opportunity to constitutionalize their desired policies before former Con-
federates returned to positions of power within national and state govern-
ments. The result was a steady. stream of northern black votes for
Republican candidates-a trend that lasted until the New Deal.'5 2
Although the Reconstruction amendments expanded federal power
(particularly the sections authorizing congressional enforcement), they
also might be seen as precommitments by the state governments, limiting
the ability of state majorities to take advantage of minorities. We think
that this view is mistaken. 153 Congress secured state ratification of the
amendments only by excluding the secessionist states and by condition-
ing readmission to the Union on prior ratification.'" This coercive re-
quirement hardly can be considered a commitment by those states. The
coercion necessary to ratify the amendments eliminates the possibility
that southern state majorities were seeking to precommit themselves.
Rather, the Reconstruction amendments constitutionally recognized the
expansion of federal power stemming from the Union victory in the Civil
War.
The choice of amendment rather than statute for the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment also reflects the need for durability in the face of
the real threat of hostile judicial interpretation of the provisions. Con-
gress feared that a Supreme Court with a number of antebellum hold-
overs might overturn the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Consequently, the
Fourteenth Amendment restated those statutory provisions to give them
greater durability. In other words, Congress used the Constitution to
guarantee that its increase of federal power would not fall to a Court
intent on defending states' rights.
3. The Progessive-Era Amendments
The Sixteenth"' and Seventeenth' 56 Amendments also increased fed-
152. Blacks were third-party beneficiaries of the efforts of Republicans. Unhappily for
the Republicans, they were partially cheated of their expected reward-the political sup-
port of black voters-by a judiciary that failed to enforce fully their privileges and per-
mited the disenfranchisement of blacks during the Jim Crow era. Nor could the
Republicans have anticipated that later generations of federal judges would employ the
Fourteenth Amendment to displace state decisionmakers-northern and southern-in a
wide range of areas unrelated to race. See eg., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971)
(holding that an Idaho statute that gives preference to men over women who are "simi-
larly situated" violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
153. Of course, we do not question the normative correctness of these amendments-
only the motivation for their adoption.
154. See Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 40-41,
50, 58 (1978).
155. U.S. Const. amend. XVI (granting Congress the power to levy a federal income
tax).
156. U.S. Const. amend. XVII (establishing procedures for the election of Senators).
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eral power. The federal government expanded rapidly in the post-Civil
War era, but this early expansion was achieved mainly through increased
regulation and an aggressive tariff policy. These provided alternative
methods of wealth redistribution for legislators with limited taxing au-
thority. 157 Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. 158 that taxation of income from real or personal property
violated the constitutional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned
among states according to population. 59 Thus, absent a judicial about-
face, Congress needed the Sixteenth Amendment to tax income and fund
wealth redistributions directly.
Similarly, the Seventeenth Amendment" 6 eliminated the control of
state legislatures' power to appoint U.S. Senators-a prerogative that
made the Senate a bastion of states-rights supporters and a substantial
obstacle to the expansion of the federal government into the realm of
traditional state powers. 6 ' Further, the increasing nationalization of the
economy and the growth of the federal regulatory role motivated inter-
est groups to organize on a national basis. As a result, congressional
politicians saw an opportunity to supply legislative protection of interest-
group privileges on a national scale. Proponents of expanding federal
authority were opposed by state legislators, who were eager to protect
their own rent-seeking domains from federal encroachment. State oppo-
sition thus posed a serious obstacle to increasing rent-seeking opportuni-
ties at the federal level, and to maximizing the value of congressional
seats. 162
The nearly contemporaneous ratification of the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth amendments163 therefore was no accident. Representatives from
southern states strongly favored the federal income tax because it would
enhance opportunities for wealth redistribution, with the cost shouldered
primarily by the industrial northeastern states, where incomes were high-
est."6 Indeed, the lock that southern senators had on the Senate com-
157. See generally Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 22, 28-29 (1971) (arguing that a function of government regulation is to per-
form distributive and allocative chores usually associated with the taxing or financial
branch of government).
158. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
159. See id. at 583.
160. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
161. This was, of course, the intention of the Framers. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 62,
at 377 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton RossIter ed., 1961) (The appointment of the Sena-
tors by the state legislature gives "the State governments such an agency in the formation
of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former. . ").
162. Our analysis here relies heavily on Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Inter-
ests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment (1990) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Dept. of Econ., Clemson University, on file with the Fordham Law Review) (argu-
ing that the Seventeenth Amendment, by making the constituency represented in the
Senate overlap closely the constituency represented in the House, reduced the costs to
interest groups of rent-seeking at the national level).
163. February 25, 1913 and May 31, 1913, respectively.
164. See Grimes, supra note 154, at 66-74.
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mittees as a result of their seniority meant that southern representatives
would derive disproportionate advantage from those rent-seeking oppor-
tunities created by the income tax. 65 Western states also favored greater
wealth redistribution, though western states would have fewer opportuni-
ties to take advantage of any wealth redistribution.
At that time, many western states had three-party systems (Demo-
cratic, Republican and Populist/Progressive), in which control of the
state legislatures, and thus the appointment of senators, "cycled" among
the three parties. The resulting rapid turnover in Senate tenure meant a
continuing seniority disadvantage, with correspondingly fewer redistrib-
utive opportunities. Direct elections promised to reduce this cycling ef-
fect and to increase the seniority of western state senators.
The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment made the enactment of the
Seventeenth Amendment vitally important to western and northern
members of Congress. Conversely, the Seventeenth Amendment was
passed without the southern representatives' support.
The Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women the right to
vote,'1 6 also reflects the importance of tying arrangements in securing
constitutional amendment. Arguably, this amendment is understood as
the product of logrolling between advocates of female suffrage and advo-
cates of Prohibition.167
Suffragists had sought a constitutional amendment for more than fifty
years. 16 If these groups had been forced to act independently, the per-
sistently high maintenance costs of suffrage groups might have kept wo-
men from gaining the ballot for an even longer period. 69  The
Prohibition movement was the main organizational glue holding wo-
men's groups together. In fact, the Women's Christian Temperance
Union ("WCTU") was the largest organization of women in the late
nineteenth century. In pursuit of a ban on the manufacture and sale of
alcoholic beverages, the WCTU became a supporter of women's
suffrage. 170
After achieving Prohibition in 1919, the political-organizational appa-
ratus devoted to banning alcohol could then be turned with relative ease
to the pursuit of women's suffrage. But the suffragists had to strike while
their political iron remained hot-hence the close proximity of the Eight-
eenth and Nineteenth amendments. Given the alliance between the
"wets" (those opposing Prohibition) and the antisuffragists,7'1 the Nine-
165. Absent GOP opposition, the South's one-party system ensured that southern
Congressmen always would have the greatest seniority.
166. See U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
167. See Ethel B. Jones, The Economics of Woman Suffrage, 20 J. Legal Stud. 423, 426
(1991).
168. See id at 423.
169. See id
170. See id at 426.
171. See Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and Supreme
Court Litigation Since 1900, at 56 (1972).
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teenth Amendment was not possible before the Eighteenth Amendment
had removed the liquor lobby's opposition.' 72 This connection can be
considered a form of constitutional logrolling.
The Eighteenth Amendment also has connections to the Sixteenth
Amendment. 73 Ideological forces played a prominent role in securing
Prohibition. Nevertheless, ideology is unlikely to have been powerful
enough, standing alone, to overcome the obstacles to a constitutional
amendment banning liquor. Prohibition cost the federal government
substantial revenue, but that revenue was replaced by the new federal
income tax.' 74
Prior to the advent of the modern income tax, the two largest sources
of federal government revenue were customs duties 75 and liquor taxa-
tion.176 The sum of customs duties and liquor taxes exceeded revenues
generated from the income tax until America's involvement in World
War 1.177 The income tax then proved its prodigious ability to generate
revenues.' 78  Income-tax revenues nearly tripled between 1916 and
1917 ' 7  and, between 1917 and 1918, they increased more than six-
fold. 8 The legislation that generated the enormous 1918 increase in in-
come-tax receipts-the War Revenue Act of 1917-was enacted in Octo-
ber 1917, two months before Congress successfully proposed the
Eighteenth Amendment.' 8 ' Thus, members of Congress were aware in
172. See Jones, supra note 167, at 423. The obstacle posed by the liquor lobby partially
explains the long time lag between the Supreme Court's decision denying constitutional
protection for women's suffrage, see Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (hold-
ing that a state constitutional provision that grants only males the right to vote does not
necessarily violate the Constitution), and passage of the amendment.
173. For further discussion on this issue, see Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard,
The Price of Prohibition (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
174. See Roy G. Blakey & Gladys C. Blakey, The Federal Income Tax 143 (1940). As
a wartime measure to conserve grain, the government outlawed the manufacture of li-
quor. See Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism 250 (1955). War-
time prohibition may have made general prohibition more palatable insofar as voters
became more accustomed to doing without liquor and, hence, less likely to punish a poli-
tician at the polls for supporting the Eighteenth Amendment. But the short time span
between the institution of wartime prohibition and Congressional approval of the Eight-
eenth Amendment (less than a year) weakens the credibility of this explanation. Because
we have no data on the extent of enforcement of wartime prohibition, we refrain here
from commenting other than to express our skepticism that it significantly eased the way
for the Eighteenth Amendment. More likely, wartime prohibition was secured by the
same forces that pushed the Eighteenth Amendment.
175. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the
United States: Colonial Times to 1970 Part 2, 1106, series Y 352-57 (1975) [hereinafter
Bureau of the Census].
176. See id. at 1107-08, series Y 358-73.
177. See id. at 1106, series Y 352-57; id. at 1108, series Y 358-73.
178. See Blakey, supra note 174, at 591, Table 39.
179. See Bureau of the Census, supra note 175, at 1107, series Y 358-372.
180. Income-tax revenues in 1916 were $125 million; in 1917 they were $360 million;
in 1918 they were $2.3 billion. See Blakey, supra note 174, at 591.
181. See id. at 151.
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October 1917 of the income tax's great revenue potential.1" 2 By the fall
of 1917, Congress looked to the income tax as the chief source of revenue
for the federal government. Consequently, in December 1917, Congress
could vote for Prohibition at a lesser cost: lost liquor-tax revenues were
easily replaced by the rapidly rising revenues obtained from taxing indi-
vidual and corporate incomes.
In February 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment quickly repealed the
Eighteenth Amendment, making it the only amendment repealing an-
other." 3 Popular wisdom holds that fourteen years of experience taught
politicians and the American people about the impracticality of banning
alcohol consumption."' Although this explanation of the Twenty-first
Amendment has some validity, it fails to explain adequately the motiva-
tion for repealing the Eighteenth Amendment only fourteen years after
its ratification.
Rather than merely responding faithfully to citizens' wishes, the
Twenty-first Amendment's proposal reflected Congress' desire for liquor-
tax revenues to replace income-tax revenues lost during the Great De-
pression,"' during which income-tax revenues fell fifty-six percent.1, 6 A
House leader in the fight for a congressional passage of the Twenty-first
Amendment admitted in 1934 that "if we [anti-prohibitionists] had not
had the opportunity of using that argument, that repeal meant needed
revenue for our Government, we would not have had repeal for at least
ten years. 187
The Twenty-first Amendment did generate higher liquor-tax revenues.
Liquor-tax receipts were $8.7 million in 1932, $43.2 million in 1933,
$258.9 million in 1934, $411 million in 1935, and $505.5 million in
1936.188 These revenues were significant to a Depression-era federal gov-
ernment facing a substantial decline in income tax receipts.
Examination of the political coalition that supported Prohibition's re-
peal reveals that politicians differed with non-politician supporters on
how to spend the additional revenues from liquor taxation. Organized
labor, as well as wealthy industrial capitalists, supported the Twenty-first
Amendment. They hoped that increased liquor taxes would substitute
182. Congress believed the War Revenue Act of 1917 would raise approximately $2.5
billion annually. See id This estimate was sound. In 1918 the federal government took
in $2.3 billion in income-tax revenue. See id at 591.
183. See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 6, at 170.
184. See eg., id at 175 (discussing public resistance to the Eighteenth Amendment).
185. See e.g., Mark H. Lef, The Limits of Symbolic Reform: The New Deal and
Taxation, 1933-1939, at 31 (1984) (quoting the 1932 Democratic Party platform calling
for repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in order "'to provide therefrom a proper and
needed revenue."' (quoting Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter, National Party Plat-
forms 1890-1972, at 332 (1973))).
186. In 1930, the U.S. government took in $2.41 billion as revenue from income taxa-
tion, while in 1932, the government took in only $1.06 billion. Income-tax receipts fell to
only $0.75 billion in 1933. See Blakey, supra note 174, at 591.
187. Left, supra note 185, at 31-32.
188. See Bureau of the Census, supra note 175, at 1107-08, series Y 358-373.
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for income taxes, thus reversing or restraining the expansion of income
taxation.1 89 In contrast, politicians saw liquor taxes as a means of buoy-
ing government spending in the wake of rapidly declining income-tax
receipts. 190
Along with the increase in liquor-tax receipts following ratification of
the Twenty-first Amendment, income-tax receipts as a percentage of
GNP also rose consistently during this period.19' This fact rebuts the
claim that wealthy industrialists and organized labor-both seeking re-
ductions in the burden of the income tax-were the primary forces per-
suading Congress to propose the Twenty-first Amendment. Rather, it
shows that members of Congress desired higher revenues. Liquor taxa-
tion, though not a perfect substitute for income taxation, was a conspicu-
ous potential source of such revenues.
Even if the citizenry during the 1920s and early 1930s did feel unduly
hindered by Prohibition, Congress could have chosen not to enforce it,
much as states today do not enforce laws against adultery and sod-
omy. 192 Without first legalizing liquor production and sales, however,
Congress could not have easily collected tax revenues from those activi-
ties.' 93 Openly taxing liquor without repealing the Eighteenth Amend-
ment would have flouted the Constitution too brazenly (and
unnecessarily, given that repeal was possible). The historical record sup-
ports our contention that Congress' desire for increased revenue drove
the Twenty-first Amendment, rather than popular sentiment against Pro-
hibition or the desire for lower income taxes.
4. Politically Neutral Amendments
Unlike the contentious fights over Prohibition and its repeal, some
constitutional amendments succeeded because, ex ante, groups were un-
able to predict who would be disadvantaged by them. For example, near
189. For evidence of organized-labor's support of ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, see Repeal Would Cause Large Income Tax Cut, 23 American Federation
of Labor Weekly News Service 1 (June 3, 1933).
190. See Leff, supra note 185, at 31.
191. Federal government income-tax receipts were 1.3% of GNP in 1933, the year the
Twenty-first Amendment was both proposed and ratified. These receipts remained at
1.3% of GNP in 1934. They rose to 1.5% of GNP in 1935, 1.7% in 1936, and to 2.4% in
1937. Moreover, after falling from 4.1% of GNP in 1931 to 3.3% in 1932, total federal-
government receipts as a percentage of GNP also increased steadily following prohibi-
tion's repeal. By 1938, the federal government's share of GNP (6.6%) was nearly double
its share in 1933 (3.6%). For the figures upon which these calculations are based, see
Bureau of the Census, supra note 175.
192. For a current example, consider the fact that laws against fornication and adul-
tery remain on the books in several states, despite a general lack of enforcement and
compliance. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 260-261, 309 (1992). Undoubtedly,
many Americans today would favor repeal of these statutes. Nevertheless, many such
statutes remain law while people everywhere violate these statutes with impunity. No
one lobbies to repeal an unenforced law.
193. Similarly, state governments could not have collected these revenues, which ex-
plains the motivation for ratification.
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the end of his second term, President Reagan argued that the Twenty-
second Amendment constrained democratic choice and should be
repealed. 194
When the amendment was proposed in 1947 by Illinois Republican
Rep. Everett Dirksen, the Republican party was smarting from their four
defeats at the hands of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Though the Republi-
can Party had a majority in both the House and the Senate, they needed
Democratic votes to secure the requisite two-thirds majority. 1"
Roosevelt's assertion of executive authority, however, had come partially
at the expense of the Southern Democrats who occupied important lead-
ership positions in Congress, and thus may explain their decisive votes in
favor of the amendment's passage. 196
At the time, the only effect of the amendment that could be predicted
with any certainty was that Congress would gain power relative to the
President, regardless of the President's political affiliation. The states
could not reliably predict whether limiting the terms of the President
would increase or decrease the growth of the federal government at their
expense. Ronald Reagan, with his agenda of deregulation, was as likely
as another Franklin Delano Roosevelt, with his agenda of government
expansion. At the time of enactment, neither the Democrats nor the
Republicans could know which party would be disadvantaged by the
Twenty-second Amendment.
The Twentieth' 97 and Twenty-fifth'9" Amendments-"house keeping"
measures clarifying Presidential succession-were unlikely to generate
interest-group opposition. No group was likely to lose from the passage
of these amendments (unlike the Twenty-second Amendment, under
which no group could predict who would be harmed). They were en-
acted as constitutional amendments simply because the existing text re-
quired it.
In sum, few, if any, of the post-Bill of Rights amendments either limit
the agency costs of the federal government or precommit the majority.
The Eleventh, Twelfth and Twenty-first Amendments, while on their
face limiting the federal government, are in fact rent-seeking opportuni-
ties by state and federal legislators. Only the Bill of Rights places sub-
stantive limits on federal government action. Thus, with the exception of
194. See U.S. Const. amend. XXII. A version of this amendment had previously been
approved by the Senate in 1824 and again in 1826. See Ames, supra note 102, at 22.
195. The major-party composition of the 80th Congress (1947-49) was as follows.
House: 245 Republicans, 188 Democrats. Senate: 51 Republicans, 45 Democrats. Con-
gressional Quarterly: 1947, at 93 (1947). Assuming party-line voting and no abstentions,
the Republicans would have required at least 291 GOP House members and 65 GOP
Senators to garner the necessary two-thirds majority for successful proposal of this
amendment. Thus, Democrats' votes were necessary.
196. Of the 47 House Democrats who voted in favor of proposing the Twenty-second
Amendment, 42 were from southern states. Of the 13 Senators who supported this
amendment, 9 were from southern states. See id at 96-97.
197. U.S. Const. amend. XX (lame-duck amendment).
198. U.S. Const amend. XXV (establishing procedures for presidential succession).
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the Twenty-seventh Amendment, no amendment ratified after 1791 has a
precommitment component or was an attempt to reduce agency costs.
The dominant trend of the amendments is to expand the powers of the
federal government, increasing federal rent-seeking opportunities
correspondingly.
The single exception to this trend, the Twenty-seventh Amendment,
effectuates a rule which did not require amendment to implement. Nor
does this amendment expand the powers of government. The Twenty-
seventh Amendment is unusual in that, although ratified in 1992, it was
proposed by James Madison (along with the Bill of Rights) more than
200 years before its ratification. Consequently, the Twenty-seventh
Amendment is at least partly the product of that era of American politics
prior to the coalescing of interest groups within government.' 99
C. The Failed Amendments: Past and Future
More than ten thousand amendments have been introduced in Con-
gress since the ratification of the Constitution.200 Of the thirty-three
amendments proposed by Congress, the states have failed to ratify only
six.20I We could not possibly examine all of the failed proposals here;
instead, we shall examine the interest-group dynamics of a few notable
examples. In looking at these particular cases, we hope to extract some
larger economic principles for the process of constitutional amendment.
After looking at two of the amendments that failed in the states, we will
look at some amendments recently proposed in Congress and predict
their prospects for success based on the positive theory developed earlier.
Finally, we will draw some conclusions about the efficacy of Article V for
achieving the efficiency goals of constitutionalism and make some sugges-
tions for amending Article V itself.
1. Past Failures
A conventional interest-group account explains the failure of the child
labor amendment, which Congress proposed in 1924 to overturn the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hammer v. Dagenhart20 2 and Bailey v.
199. On the ratification process for Madison's second proposed amendment, see Rich-
ard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 497 (1992); Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment
Joins the Constitution, Wall St. J., May 13, 1992 at A15.
200. See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 6, at 169.
201. See id. at app. B, at 301-303. The six include Madison's first (increasing the size
of the legislature with population growth); an amendment revoking the citizenship of any
person accepting a title of nobility from a foreign sovereign; an 1861 amendment protect-
ing slavery (mooted by the Civil War); the child labor amendment of 1924; the Equal
Rights Amendment; and the District of Columbia Statehood amendment, proposed in
1978. The D.C. Congressional amendment received a chilly reception in the states,
which had no interest in dividing the pork up among more claimants.
202. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding as unconstitutional an act that prohibited the inter-
state transportation of goods made at factories in which children under the age of four-
teen had been employed).
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Drexel Furniture Co. 20 3 Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, called a national conference of interest groups to push for
the amendment in the wake of the Court's decisions. From this confer-
ence emerged the Permanent Conference for the Abolition of Child La-
bor.2 ' The amendment provided:
Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and pro-
hibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
Section 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article
except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent
necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.205
Not surprisingly, most prominent among the groups that supported the
amendment were trade unions and school teachers." 6 Competition pro-
vided by child labor reduced the monopoly wage rates demanded by
trade unions. Schoolteachers could expect an amendment prohibiting
child labor to bring higher rates of school attendance, with commensu-
rate greater demand for educational services and larger school
budgets.20 7
The push for the amendment also included a number of prominent
women's groups.20° The women supporting the child labor amendment
were hardly a cross section of American society. Rather, they were ideo-
logically motivated veterans of Hull House and the women's suffrage
movement.2o9 These women saw federal regulation of the treatment of
children as the first step toward emancipating women. 210 They were par-
tially responsible for specifying eighteen rather than sixteen years old as
the relevant age in the amendment and the use of "labor" rather than
"employment" in the amendment's text.2 " The use of "eighteen" and
"labor" suggested the broader aims of some of the amendment's support-
ers, and the amendment's opponents used those objectives to great effect
in fighting the amendment. The ideological element in the pro-amend-
ment coalition caused the group to overreach and the amendment ulti-
mately to fail.
203. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (holding that a congressional act which was designed to dis-
courage child labor through tax penalties could not be sustained as constitutional by
claiming federal taxing power, because that type of regulation is reserved exclusively to
the states).
204. See Walter I. Trattner, Crusade for the Children 163-64 (1970).
205. Id. at 168.
206. See Grimes, supra note 154, at 102.
207. See E.G. West, The Political Economy of American Public School Legislation, 10
J.L. & Econ. 101, 125-27 (1967) (identifying the forces behind compulsory attendance
laws). But see Linda N. Edwards, An Empirical Analysis of Compulsory Schooling Legis-
lation, 1940-1960, 21 J.L. & Econ. 203 (1978) (questioning the assumption that compul-
sory attendance laws increase school enrollment).
208. See Grimes, supra note 154, at 102.
209. See Bill Kauffman, The Child Labor Amendment Debate of the 1920s, in 16 Es-
says in Political Economy 10 (Ludvig von Mises Institute, 1992).
210. See id. at 14. More extreme advocates urged the centralization of child-rearing in
the state in order to allow American women to "take their rightful place in society." Id.
211. See id, at 9.
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The opposition to the amendment was also predictable. David Clark,
editor of the Southern Textile Bulletin, organized the Executive Commit-
tee of Southern Cotton Manufacturers, which staged a full scale political
blitz against the amendment.21 2 Child labor gave southern textile produ-
cers a comparative advantage over their New England competitors, who
were constrained by more restrictive state legislation.2 3 The Executive
Committee was joined by the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Sentinels of the Republic, and the Woman Patriot, the former mouth-
piece of the Anti-Suffrage Association. These groups had in common
their business funding and their opposition to government interven-
tion.2" 4 They principally argued that Congress could not be trusted with
the power conferred by the amendment and believed that the amendment
threatened parental control of education and of child labor at home and
on the family farm.215 The first charge resonated loudly within the Ro-
man Catholic church. The church feared government intervention in pa-
rochial education, which had come under siege during the 1920s.2 16 The
Catholic church's opposition led to the defeat of the amendment in Mas-
sachusetts, despite the comparative disadvantage that the state's textile
mills faced from the use of child labor in the South.217 Likewise, farm
organizations, fearing the regulation of child labor on family farms,
played a key role in defeating the amendment in rural states.218
Because they exploited the agency cost threat posed by the expansion
of congressional power, opposition groups proved too strong for support-
ers of the amendment. By granting Congress broad discretion over the
regulation of child labor, the amendment created the potential for inter-
est groups to manipulate Congress to extract rents from more diffuse in-
terests. Interests opposing the amendment that appeared ineffective at a
national level, however, proved to be quite effective at the state level.
Consequently, the amendment stalled in the states, but was later ren-
dered moot by the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the reach of the
Commerce Clause, which granted Congress all the power that the
amendment would have conferred and more.219
The Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), perhaps the most prominent
of the failed amendments, requires a more complicated interest group
analysis. The amendment provided as follows:
212. See Stephen B. Wood, Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor
and the Law 42-51 (1968).
213. See id. at 298.
214. See Trattner, supra note 204, at 166-67.
215. See id. at 170-71; Kauffman, supra note 209, at 12-15.
216. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down Oregon's
attempt to prohibit parochial education).
217. See Trattner, supra note 204, at 175-76.
218. See id. at 174.
219. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (finding that the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 is within the commerce power and connected with the Fifth and
Tenth Amendments).
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1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of this article.
3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.22 0
The ERA had overwhelming support when approved by the Congress. " '
However, the state legislatures failed to ratify the amendment in part
because of the perceived vagueness of its terms. The ERA's opponents
argued that its vague terms would free the judiciary to mandate, among
other horribles, single-sex bathrooms, homosexual marriage, federal
funding of abortion, and the drafting of women into the military.' -
The burden that vagueness imposed on the ERA's passage illustrates
how the need for judicial enforcement complicates the strategic choices
of interest groups. If we loosen the assumption of faithful agency by the
judiciary, the costs of vagueness quickly become overwhelming. The
vagueness of the ERA was especially damning in the wake of the Warren
Court, which had interpreted creatively the Constitution to recognize a
number of previously undiscovered constitutional rights.'m After the
Warren Court's activism, state politicians were wary of entrusting such
politically charged subject matter to the federal judiciary.
Specific language in a statute or constitutional amendment increases
the probability that judges will enforce the provision in a way that maxi-
mizes the benefits to the purchasing interest group. Specific language
may induce faithful agency by the judiciary if ignoring those specific
mandates might impair the judiciary's prestige in the public mind. Con-
versely, specificity increases the costs of enactment by making opposition
more likely since potential losers will be able to identify themselves more
readily. As a consequence, if the federal judiciary is perceived to be a
faithful agent of the enacting coalition, both statutory and constitutional
provisions often will be phrased in vague terms, with their proponents
taking their chances on judicial enforcement.
The costs associated with vagueness became painfully apparent the
year after the ERA was proposed, when the Supreme Court guaranteed
the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade." 4 The decision's extremely loose
connection to the Due Process Clause lent credibility to the arguments of
ERA opponents who alleged that the Supreme Court would freely over-
ride the social policies of the states.2" Vagueness, coupled with the fear
220. Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 1 (1986).
221. See id. at 11-12.
222. See Mary F. Berry, Why ERA Failed 102 (1986).
223. See eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (applying "one person, one
vote" standard to hold that the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral legislature must be apportioned on a population basis (quoting
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963))).
224. See 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
225. See Mansbridge, supra note 220, at 27.
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of expansive judicial interpretation, led to consequences that the enacting
voter was unlikely to have supported back in 1865 when voting for the
Fourteenth Amendment. The parade of horribles predicted by ERA op-
ponents seemed more plausible (and more threatening) in the hands of a
Court that appeared intent on furthering a substantive ideological
agenda. Moreover, many of the ERA's supporters, like the National Or-
ganization of Women, also supported Roe, and the two causes became
intertwined in the minds of some state politicians.226
Vagueness also creates the risk of free riding by groups that have not
contributed to the acquisition of the provision, which in turn may ham-
per the ability of interest groups to organize. Through favorable judicial
interpretation, women have gained a free ride from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite their failure to contribute
to its passage.227 Free riding discourages the initial formation of interest
groups because of the collective action problem that it creates: no one
wants to contribute to the common good because the benefits are shared
equally, whether or not one contributes. Judicial protection for women's
rights under the Equal Protection Clause228 impaired the development of
groups supporting the ERA. Indeed, the new found protections under
the Equal Protection Clause, in tandem with the benefits provided to wo-
men under federal civil rights legislation, rendered the ERA only mar-
ginally beneficial, thus impeding organization in support of the
amendment.229
In an effort to overcome their high maintenance costs, ERA support-
ers increasingly became radical in their claims for the ERA (such as ex-
tending the draft to women).230 These claims, while solidifying the
support of activist volunteers, caused the defection of marginal support-
ers.2 31 This suggests an interesting dynamic at work in ideologically-
based interest groups like those that pushed the ERA. Radicalism may
be necessary to provide the requisite psychic benefits for volunteers who
cannot point to any tangible result from their efforts. In an earlier exam-
ple, Prohibition supporters would not have settled for an amendment
limiting the hours and locations of saloons. Similarly, ideological ele-
ments in the movement for a child-labor amendment insisted upon broad
language which ultimately led to the demise of that amendment. Thus, a
226. See id. at 13. Towards the end of the ratification period, some feminist attorneys
argued that state equivalents of the ERA required state funding for abortions. See id. at
123-24.
227. See Ruth B. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 161-72. According to Ginsburg, "the framers of
the fourteenth amendment did not contemplate sex equality." Id. at 161.
228. See. e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that Oklahoma statute
which had a gender-based difference in the legal age to purchase beer violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
229. See Mansbridge, supra note 220, at 46.
230. See id. at 2-3.
231. See id.
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tendency toward ideological purity may reduce the effectiveness of ideo-
logical interest groups with the marginal voter.
The history of the ERA also illustrates the complicated interaction
between the provisions of Article III and Article V. Article III's grant of
judicial independence gives judges substantial discretion over the inter-
pretation of the Constitution. 2 Employed expansively, this discretion
may produce substantive results that are indistinguishable from Article
V's amendment. Such expansive interpretation of Article IMl by judges is
sometimes justified by the difficulty of amendment under Article V.
The ERA's history makes that justification appear to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Expansive interpretation may deter groups from seeking
amendments because of the free-rider problems it causes for interest-
group formation, while, at the same time, fear of unpredictable conse-
quences may enhance opposition to proposed amendments. Thus, at the
margin, the expansive interpretation of the Constitution permitted by
Article III deters constitutional amendment through Article V.
2. Future Failures
We turn now to several amendments currently under consideration in
Congress.
One example is an amendment limiting the terms of members of Con-
gress.2 33 Such an amendment has little prospect of success, because Con-
gress is unlikely to restrict its own ability to extract money and votes.
Unlimited terms, in conjunction with the seniority system employed by
Congress, create a form of property rights for members of Congress. By
creating partial monopolies over certain legislative domains, these prop-
erty rights reduce competition among members of Congress for commit-
tee chairmanships, which under congressional rules give them wide
discretion over the enactment of legislation. Without the monopoly
power conferred by these quasi-property rights, competition would dissi-
pate the rents available to members of Congress. 4 These property
rights also can be transferred from generation to generation, thus maxi-
mizing the value of both legislation (by making repeal less likely) and
Congressional seats (by securing legislators' ability to extract the rewards
provided by their positions).235
A term-limits amendment would disrupt this system of property
rights, forcing members of Congress to compete among themselves for
232. See generally Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 51.
233. No term-limits amendment has been formally proposed by Congress. For an ex-
ample of such a provision at the state level, see Cal. Elections Code § 25003 (Vest 1993).
234. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seekng, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of
Succession, 26 J.L. & Econ. 71, 78-82 (1983).
235. See generally Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organiza-
tion of Congress; or, Why Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J.
Pol. Econ. 132 (1988) (arguing that the workings of Congress appear remarkably suited
to legislators' reelection goals).
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choice committee assignments and control over legislation. This would
impair their ability to extract rents from interest groups and reduce the
value of a congressional seat. Congress' opposition to the amendment
can be expected. Moreover, the Democratic Party has been the domi-
nant coalition in the House of Representatives for generations and has
little incentive to jeopardize its comfortable situation. Although the Re-
publican Party views the amendment as an opportunity to restore its
competitiveness, it has no market power with which to enact the requisite
amendment. This absence of power contrasts sharply with the market
power Republicans wielded after the Civil War. At that time, the party
used its power to gain the Reconstruction amendments. The structural
advantages conferred by those amendments permitted the Republicans to
dominate the post-war era. Today, the Republican Party lacks the mar-
ket power necessary to gain the term-limits amendment.
Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzer argue that a term-limits amend-
ment would encourage more rent-seeking in Congress, rather than
less.236 They contend that shortening the tenure of members of Congress
will induce representatives to adopt a short-term perspective, thus en-
couraging "looting" by lame-duck legislators.237 According to Cohen
and Spitzer, legislators would seek more bribes and promises of lucrative
employment from interest groups in lieu of campaign contributions and
votes.238 Even assuming that term limits could lead to a short-term per-
spective, however, the amendment could bring a net social benefit
through less legislative wealth redistribution. Indeed, Cohen and Spitzer
concede that term limits could reduce the overall amount of legisla-
tion.239 Much legislation sought by interest groups produces rents only
over time. In order to extract those rents, politicians must be able to
threaten credibly the repeal of that legislation in future periods. If politi-
cians cannot extract those rents in future periods, they will have less in-
centive to enact the legislation in the first place. This suggests that
members of Congress would shift to extracting rents by threatening legis-
lation, rather than by creating legislation that produces a stream of rents
for interest groups which Congress can later extract.240 Even that threat
may be lessened, however, since term limits would disrupt the system of
property rights in Congress. This would force members of Congress to
spend time and resources competing among themselves for control over
legislation. Under the current regime, politicians have revealed a prefer-
236. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 Geo. L.J. 477 (1992).
237. See id. at 521.
238. See id. at 509-510.
239. See id. at 509.
240. On the distinction between rent creation and rent extraction, see generally
McChesney, supra note 22 (arguing that politicians may maximize returns first by threat-
ening and then by forbearing expropriation of existing private results). See also R. Beck
et al., Rent Extraction Through Political Extortion: An Empirical Examination, 21 J.
Legal Stud. 217, 217 (1992) (providing empirical evidence supporting McChesney's
theory).
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ence for power over money, choosing reelection over cashing in on their
positions. After all, most politicians could secure jobs that are much
more lucrative than a congressional salary.24'
The "long-term perspective" brought about by the desire for reelection
has substantial social costs. Legislation that transfers wealth by protect-
ing an interest group usually has a substantial effect on the allocation of
resources.24 2 This allocative effect brings with it a dead-weight loss to
society which may be much greater than the amount of wealth trans-
ferred to the purchasing interest group. For this reason, the direct bribes
that Cohen and Spitzer fear would result under a term-limits regime may
be much less costly for society than the rents that would otherwise be
created by legislation. Given these possible disruptions to their property
rights regime, however, members of Congress are unlikely to pass a term-
limits amendment.
Similar obstacles face the balanced-budget amendment.24 3 Running a
budget deficit year after year allows politicians to transfer wealth from
unrepresented future generations to currently effective interest groups.2
44
Over time, interest payments on the accumulating debt requires a greater
percentage of the budget and the creditworthiness of the government cor-
respondingly declines.2 45 The nation as a whole bears these costs, how-
ever, and members of Congress are not held individually responsible for
the continually growing national debt. Members of Congress find them-
selves in a Prisoner's Dilemma in acting as agents for their constituents:
securing pork for their districts continues to produce votes and contribu-
tions, while voting to limit spending or raise taxes is certain to impair
their ability to be reelected.2'6 As members of Congress will always re-
tain some ability to impose externalities on currently unrepresented fu-
ture generations, they will continue to resist the precommitment that a
balanced budget amendment would impose.247 Instead of precommit-
241. We readily concede that there may be exceptions to this proposition. Despite the
relatively low salaries that Congress pays its members, a significant number seem to
emerge from congressional service with substantial wealth. The wealth producing advan-
tages that result from congressional service may accrue only over time, thus supporting
the theory that members of Congress are not opposed to term limits because they think
that it will lead to increased rent seeking.
242. See Posner, supra note 157, at 28-29.
243. For the text of one version of such an amendment, see E. Donald Elliott, Consti-
tutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 Duke L.J. 1077, 1104 n. 102.
244. See generally Edward Foster, The Balanced Budget Amendment and Economic
Thought, 2 Const. Commentary 353 (1985) (surveying public choice theories of the
budget deficit).
245. See James D. Davidson, Budget Amendment Foes Forget Constitutional History,
Wall St. J., June 4, 1992, at A9.
246. See Mark A. Zupan, An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of
Political Ticket Splitting, 34 J.L. & Econ. 343, 352-53 (1991).
247. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, House Rejects Bid to Require Balanced Budget, Wall St.
J., June 12, 1992, at A2 ("The House, after intense lobbying by Democratic leaders and
an unusual coalition of interest groups, narrowly defeated a constitutional amendment
that would have required the U.S. government to balance its budget.").
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ment, when provisions are proposed that would limit spending (such as
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings),24 s Congress provides enough loopholes and
exceptions to make those provisions unenforceable.24 9 A similar fate
would likely befall any constitutional amendment that made it through
Congress.
The term-limits amendment and the balanced-budget amendment face
an insurmountable obstacle in Congress' control over the agenda of the
constitutional amendment process. Our analysis of the successful
amendments shows that Congress has used its agenda control over the
constitutional amendment process to expand its own influence and
power, with a corresponding increase in the opportunities for rent-seek-
ing at the federal level. Both precommitment strategies and the reduc-
tion of agency costs require that the majoritarian Congress be controlled
through the Constitution. Our positive theory of constitutional amend-
ment and the history of Article V, demonstrate however, that Congress is
unlikely to impose restrictions on itself that would impair its members'
ability to extract money and votes.
Congressional control over the agenda of constitutional amendment
restricts the ability of the people to control Congress effectively through
the Constitution. 250 As a consequence, Article V poorly serves the nor-
mative efficiency theories of constitutionalism. By placing the foxes in
charge of the chicken coop, the Framers made Article V useless for
achieving those efficiency goals of constitutionalism: precommitment
and the reduction of agency costs.
These flaws suggest that Article V itself should be amended. A revised
Article V could provide for direct petition by the people to propose con-
stitutional amendments. 251 An expanded right of petition would permit
individuals to place constitutional amendment proposals on the state's
ballot for approval by popular referendum. Such a mechanism, even if it
incorporated super-majoritarian provisions, would give the people the
power to bind their agents and themselves through the Constitution. 252
248. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-
922 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
249. See id. § 905(g). This section of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act contains a list,
running for more than two pages, of government-spending programs protected to one
degree or another from mandatory budget cuts. For example, the Alaska Power Admin-
istration, the National Credit Union Administration, and the annuity fund for survivors
of Tax Court judges are just three of the numerous budget items protected from the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget ax.
250. We discount here the convention method for amending the Constitution, primar-
ily because it has never been used. The flaw in the convention method is that it relies on
the state legislatures to call a convention; state legislatures may also be a source of agency
costs.
251. See Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988). Amar has suggested that no amendment is
necessary to empower the people to amend the Constitution.
252. Of course, any popular movement to amend the Constitution would face the
same-if not greater-problems of collective action that are faced by interest groups.
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With that mechanism available, proposals that enjoy broad popular sup-
port, like the balanced-budget and term-limits amendments, would stand
a fighting chance of ratification. The amendment process might move
closer to serving the efficiency goals of constitutionalism.
Those readers not caught up by the persuasiveness of our argument for
amending Article V already will have recognized the absurdity of our
having offered it. An amendment to Article V would surely fall prey to
the same forces that doom the term-limits and balanced-budget amend-
ments. In the words of Thomas Foley, the current Speaker of the House
of Representatives: "I'm a real fiery defender of the Constitution.... On
my watch, I'm not going to have the Constitution amended, if I can
avoid it."2" 3 Members of Congress would have to be very public-spirited
to cede the effective monopoly they exercise over constitutional amend-
ment. Our historical survey shows that the assumption of private inter-
ests more reliably predicts the success or failure of a proposed
constitutional amendment. We offer our proposal to amend Article V as
a final example of a failed amendment, quite certain that it is sure to be
strangled in the cradle as quickly as it comes forth from our word proces-
sor. We thus conclude that Article V, despite its flaws, will remain the
sole avenue for amending the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted in this Article to develop an economic theory, both
positive and normative, of constitutional amendment under Article V.
Our positive theory focused on the role of interest groups in pushing for,
and opposing, constitutional amendments. The predictive variables that
we identified were maintenance costs and the anticipated timing and
strength of opposition. Our normative theory focused on the reduction
of agency costs and precommitment strategies as the efficiency goals of
constitutionalism.
We applied our positive theory to the history of constitutional amend-
ment under Article V to assess its efficacy in achieving those normative
goals. Our analysis of the twenty-seven constitutional amendments en-
acted contrasted the Bill of Rights, which has elements of both agency-
cost reduction and precommitment, with the latter seventeen, which
have increased the agency costs of the federal government and have little
or no precommitment character. The variables that we identified as re-
sponsible for this shift were the decline of the states as a coherent interest
group and Congress' agenda control over constitutional amendment,
which permits Congress to satisfy the demands of government as an in-
terest group. We concluded that, in attempting to put the Constitution
beyond the reach of narrow interest groups, the Founders also put the
Constitution beyond the ability of the majority to precommit on substan-
253. David Rogers, After Years of Gridlock and Scandals Foley Appears Poised to Ful-
fill Potential as Speaker, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1992, at A10.
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tive matters and to control the agency costs imposed by their representa-
tives in Congress. The history of the failed amendments supports this
conclusion: countless amendments have failed that would have restricted
the power of the federal government. Although the Framers put the
Constitution largely out of the reach of "factions," other than the faction
of government itself, they did so at the cost of depriving the majority of
meaningful control over the content of the Constitution, and destroying
the usefulness of Article V in serving the efficiency goals of constitution-
alism. Despite our view that the Article V amendment process is dra-
matically flawed, we remain pessimistic that anything can or will be done
to improve the process.
